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Abstract
This Comment analyzes the effect of such predictions on current U.S.-Mexican extradition
policy. Part I examines the events leading up to the Court’s controversial ruling in Alvarez in the
context of established principles and legal precedent on extradition and foreign abductions. Part II
describes how controversial the Court’s decision was on a domestic and global scale. Specifically,
Part II explores opposition from the international community, including responses from the Mexican government and other Latin American countries. Part II also examines domestic reactions to
the decision among commentators and scholars, executive leaders, federal courts, and members of
the U.S. Congress (”Congress”). Part II suggests that the recent trend in U.S.-Mexican extradition
policy indicates more cooperation, not less. It suggests that the signing of the North American
Free Trade Agreement21 (”NAFTA”) and the Treaty to Prohibit Transborder Abductions (”Transborder Abduction Treaty”) 22 evidence a determination to forge better relations between both
governments. Part II examines the Clinton Administration’s decision to re-certify Mexico for state
aid in the joint fight against drug trafficking, and how this act prompted Congress to re-examine
U.S.-Mexican extradition policy since Alvarez. It also describes how recent efforts by the Mexican government to alter its reluctant policy on extradition led to the surrender of several suspects
upon request of the U.S. government. Part III argues that improvement in U.S. Mexican relations
influenced renewed efforts to establish a more cooperative extradition policy between the two
countries. Unfortunately, drug trafficking and corruption continue to plague the Mexican justice
system and to impede an effective system of extradition. This Comment concludes that until the
U.S. government adopts a more aggressive policy on extradition with Mexico addressing these
problems, it will continue to favor international abductions in lieu of extradition.

COMMENT
U.S.-MEXICAN EXTRADITION POLICY:
WERE THE PREDICTIONS RIGHT ABOUT ALVAREZ?
Argiro Kosmetatos *
Society is the ultimate loser when, in order to convict the
guilty, it uses methods that lead to decreased respect for the
law.,
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the U.S. government provoked considerable
controversy by asserting the power to seize drug traffickers, terrorists, and other fugitives abroad for the purpose of prosecuting
them under the U.S. justice system.2 As a long-standing practice,
U.S. law enforcement agents occasionally engaged in state-sponsored abductions' in lieu of extradition 4 as a more expedient
means of arresting fugitive offenders in foreign jurisdictions.5
Over a century ago, the U.S. Supreme Court (the "Court")
established that state-sponsored abductions of foreign criminal
* J.D. Candidate, 1999, Fordham University School of Law. I dedicate this
Comment to my family for their love and support, and to my mentor and friend,
Special Assistant Attorney General Michael R. Berlowitz, for his wonderful sense of
humor. Special thanks to Prof. Abraham Abramovsky.
1. United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 274 (2d Cir. 1970).
2. See, e.g., James Vicini, High Court Upholds U.S. Kidnapping of Suspects Abroad,
REUTERS N. Am. WIRE, June 15, 1992 (describing U.S. Justice Department opinion suggesting that U.S. government agents may arrest suspects abroad without prior approval
of state where arrest occurs).
3. See M. CHERIF BAssIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION: UNITED STATES LAW AND
PRAcrICE 219 (3d ed. 1996) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION] (defining statesponsored abduction as unilateral act by which one state acting under color of law
seizes suspect in jurisdiction of foreign state without securing latter state's consent).
The abductors are usually government agents. Id. The U.N. Security Council and General Assembly view abductions as unilateral acts of aggression in violation of international law and the U.N. Charter. See, e.g., Oscar Schachter, United Nations Law, 88 AM. J.
INT'L L. 1, 11 (1994) (noting that U.N. Charter gives priority to peaceful settlement of
disputes rather than coercive enforcement of law).
4. See INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, supra note 3, at 5 (defining extradition as surrender of criminal suspect by one state to foreign state upon proper formal request).
5. See Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886) (establishing traditional rule sanctioning
abduction of foreign suspects).
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defendants did not deprive federal courts of jurisdiction to prosecute and to convict these individuals. 6 Six years ago, the Court
reaffirmed this precedent in United States v. Alvarez-Machain.7
The Court's decision in Alvarez generated much controversy and
criticism. 8 Many scholars and commentators argued that the decision was a clear violation of international law and national sovereignty.9 Some, however, praised the Court for erring on the
side of law enforcement, pointing to increased drug trafficking
and to the prevalent corruption in the Mexican government.'
Supporters of the decision argued that foreign suspects often
eluded capture by U.S. law enforcement agents simply by fleeing
to countries like Mexico that have well-known policies against
extradition."
Strained relations between the U.S. and Mexican governments, and the Mexican government's failure to arrest some of
the most notorious leaders of Mexican drug cartels, cast doubt
on the utility of extradition as an effective and expedient
method of apprehension. 1 2 Since the U.S. and Mexican govern6. See id. (describing futility of making formal request for extradition of suspect
from foreign state experiencing civil war).
7. 504 U.S. 655 (1992). The U.S. Supreme Court ("Court") determined that the
defendant, a Mexican citizen, could not challenge a federal court's jurisdiction to prosecute him based on the unlawfulness of his arrest. id.
8. See, e.g.,
William J. Aceves, The Legality of TransborderAbductions: A Study of United
States v. Alvarez-Machain, 3 Sw. J.L. & TRADE AM. 101, 103 (1996), (describing domestic
and foreign responses to impact of Alvarez ruling on territorial sovereignty).
9. Id.; see Hernan de J. Ruiz-Bravo, Monstrous Decision: KidnappingIs Legal, 20 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 833 (1993) (urging Congress to adopt legislation expressly prohibiting international kidnappings and similar violations of international law); Fernando R.
Teson, InternationalAbductions, Low-Intensity Conflicts and State Sovereignty: A Moral Inquiry, 31 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 551 (1994) (applying moral inquiry when analyzing
international abductions).
10. See, e.g.,
Malvina Halberstam, InternationalKidnapping: In Defense of the Supreme
Court Decision in Alvarez-Machain, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 736 (1992) (suggesting that holding
of Alvarez is consistent with long line of cases granting broad powers to executive in
conduct of foreign affairs); Jimmy Gurul6, Terrorism, TerritorialSovereignty, and the Forcible
Apprehension of International CriminalsAbroad, 17 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 457
(1994) (opining that decision did not, contrary to claim by critics, grant federal law
enforcement officers license to kidnap fugitives abroad).
11. See Mitchell J. Matorin, Note, Unchaining the Law: The Legality of Extraterritorial
Abduction in Lieu ofExtradition,41 DuKE L.J. 907 (1992) (noting that exigencies of international law enforcement justify availability of irregular means of securing custody over
criminal defendants in certain limited cases).
12. See Bruce Zagaris & Julia Padierna Peralta, Mexico-United States Extradition and
Alternatives: From Fugitive Slaves to Drug Traffickers-150 Years and Beyond the Rio Grande's
Winding Courses, 12 Am. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 519, 584 (1997) (describing Mexican
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ments signed the U.S.-Mexican Extradition Treaty 13 ("Treaty")
in 1978, the Mexican government has not, as a matter of general
14
policy, extradited its citizens to the United States upon request.
In fact, it was not until 1996 that Mexico surrendered four of its
citizens to the United States for prosecution, two of them for
drug trafficking. 5 Significantly, the Treaty does not require
16
either state to extradite its citizens.
Increased reports of corruption among high-ranking Mexican law enforcement agents and influential leaders of the Mexican regime did little to instill U.S. faith in Mexico's justice system. 7 The urgent need to curtail international drug trafficking"8 and growing frustration with Mexico's extradition
procedures prompted the U.S. government to use self-help
measures in apprehending foreign suspects. 19 Many warned that
the U.S. government's unilateral abduction of Dr. Humberto Alvarez-Machain would have serious repercussions on already
strained relations between Mexico and the United States, particularly with regard to joint efforts by both states to combat intergovernment's policy against extradition of Mexican citizens wanted for drug-related
crimes).
13. Extradition Treaty Between the United States of America and the United Mexican States, May 4, 1978, U.S.-Mex., 31 U.S.T. 5059 [hereinafter Treaty].
14. See Zagaris & Peralta, supra note 12, at 584 (describing U.S.-Mexican Extradition Treaty ("Treaty") as obstacle to securing extradition of Mexican nationals).
15. See Richard Parker & Mike Gallagher, The Seeds of Narco-Democracy, ALBUQUERQUE J., Mar. 2, 1997, at Al (considering impact of drug trafficking and corruption on
emerging political growth in Mexico).
16. See Treaty, supra note 13, art. 9(1), at 5059 (giving both states option to prosecute citizens as alternative to extradition).
17. See Symposium, KidnappingForeign CriminalSuspects, 15 WH-IIER L. REv. 419,
427 (1994) (illustrating how circumstances preceding and following abduction of U.S.
law enforcement agent evidence extensive corruption within Mexican government).
Corruption plagued Guadalajara and many other Mexican regions in the mid-1980s.
Id. Narcotics traffickers operated with impunity simply by bribing Mexican police and
corrupt politicians. Id. Mexican law enforcement officials allegedly did little to assist
their U.S. counterparts in their search for the abductors and killers of a U.S. drug enforcement agent. Id. Reports of corruption continue to this day. See, e.g., 143 CONG.
REC. S2581, S2583 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 1997) (statement of Sen. Coverdell) (noting that
corruption remains modus operandi for Mexican Federal Judicial Police).
18. See Aceves, supra note 8, at 104-05 (describing significant increase in drug trafficking operations by Mexican cartels).
19. See, e.g., 139 CONG. REc. H6964 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1993) (statement of Rep.
Brown) (suggesting that breakdown in U.S.-Mexican extradition policy directly resulted
from consistent refusal of Mexican government to extradite Mexican nationals suspected of committing crimes under U.S. law to stand trial, even in cases involving murder, assault, rape, or statutory rape).
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national crime."
This Comment analyzes the effect of such predictions on
current U.S.-Mexican extradition policy. Part I examines the
events leading up to the Court's controversial ruling in Alvarez in
the context of established principles and legal precedent on extradition and foreign abductions. Part II describes how controversial the Court's decision was on a domestic and global scale.
Specifically, Part II explores opposition from the international
community, including responses from the Mexican government
and other Latin American countries. Part II also examines domestic reactions to the decision among commentators and scholars, executive leaders, federal courts, and members of the U.S.
Congress ("Congress"). Part II suggests that the recent trend in
U.S.-Mexican extradition policy indicates more cooperation, not
less. It suggests that the signing of the North American Free
Trade Agreement2 1 ("NAFTA") and the Treaty to Prohibit
Transborder Abductions ("Transborder Abduction Treaty") 22 evidence a determination to forge better relations between both
governments. Part II examines the Clinton Administration's decision to re-certify Mexico for state aid in the joint fight against
drug trafficking, and how this act prompted Congress to re-examine U.S.-Mexican extradition policy since Alvarez. It also describes how recent efforts by the Mexican government to alter its
reluctant policy on extradition led to the surrender of several
suspects upon request of the U.S. government. Part III argues
that improvement in U.S. Mexican relations influenced renewed
efforts to establish a more cooperative extradition policy between the two countries. Unfortunately, drug trafficking and
20. See generally Marjorie Miller, Mexico Attacks Ruling: Halts Drug War Role, L.A.
TIMES, June 16, 1992, at Al; Ruth Marcus, Kidnapping Outside U.S. Is Upheld; Supreme

Court Rules Government Can Seize Foreignersfor Trial, WAs-. POST, June 16, 1992, at Al;
Philip Shenon, Mexico Says Doctor's CaptureImperils Aid to U.S. on Drugs, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
20, 1990, at Al.
21. North American Free Trade Agreement, Sept. 6, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 289 [hereinafter NAFTA]. The United States, Mexico, and Canada signed the North American Free
Trade Agreement ("NAFTA") in September 1993. Id. The U.S. House of Representatives approved NAFTA on November 17, 1993. Id. NAFTA is an economic agreement
designed to create an expanded and secure market for the flow of goods and services
produced in the United States, Mexico, and Canada. Id. at 297.
22. Treaty to Prohibit Transborder Abductions, Nov. 23, 1994, U.S.-Mex., 31
U.S.T. 5059, reprinted in Michael Abbell & Bruno A. Ristau, 4 INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL
ASSISTANCE: CRIMINAL § 13-4-1, at A-676.3 (Supp. 1995) [hereinafter Transborder Abduction Treaty].
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corruption continue to plague the Mexican justice system and to
impede an effective system of extradition. This Comment concludes that until the U.S. government adopts a more aggressive
policy on extradition with Mexico addressing these problems, it
will continue to favor international abductions in lieu of extradition.
I. EXTRADITION AND FOREIGNABDUCTION
Extradition is a formal process through which a state diplomatically surrenders criminal suspects to foreign governments
requesting transfer of such persons. 2' Extradition is premised
upon fundamental principals of international law. 24 States typically cooperate in establishing specific procedures for extradition under a treaty agreement. 25 Where no treaty exists, the
2
27
principles of reciprocity26 and comity govern extradition. 1
29
Irregular rendition is another method of overseas arrest.
23. See INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, supra note 3, at 2-3 (discussing origin of extradition as good will practice of transferring fugitives between sovereign states).
24. SeeJohn G. Kester, Some Myths of United States ExtraditionLaw, 76 GEO. L.J. 1441,
1454 (1988) (suggesting that principles of international law prescribe boundaries for
arrest of suspects in foreign jurisdictions). Respect for territorial sovereignty is an important principle of international law. Id.
25. See INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, supra note 3, at 49 (describing content and
purpose of extradition agreements). Extradition treaties are bilateral or multilateral
agreements designed to promote cooperation between states with respect to the transfer of fugitive criminal offenders. Id. Most current extradition agreements are bilateral. Id. Typically, they provide that a state must either deliver the accused to the
government requesting jurisdiction or prosecute him under its own laws. See M. CHERIF
BAssIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 6-7 (1974) [hereinafter

WORLD PUBLIC ORDER]

(referring to doctrine of aut dedere autjudicare).

26. See INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, supra note 3, at 17 (explaining that reciprocity reflects customary practice of sovereign states regarding surrender of criminal defendants). Under the principle of reciprocity, the government of a state usually grants
an extradition request only in exchange for the extradition or promise of future extradition of an individual that such government seeks from its counterpart. Id. Reciprocity could become binding under international law if a state's practice in surrendering
wanted offenders to the custody of a requesting government is so consistent that it
becomes a custom of that state. Id.
27. See id. (defining comity as act of courtesy and goodwill cooperation between
states).
28. See id. (describing reciprocity and comity as international principals of friendly
cooperation among states).
29. See Abraham Abramovsky, Extraterritorial Abductions: America's "Catch and
Snatch"Policy Run Amok, 31 VA.J. INT'L L. 151, 155 (1991) (defining irregular rendition
as informal arrangement between state officials for surrender of criminal defendant);

see also WORLD

PUB IC ORDER,

supra note 25, at 127-28 (suggesting that informal ar-
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Overseas abduction is one example of irregular rendition. 30
The U.S. government employed overseas abduction several
years ago when it captured three Mexican citizens implicated in
the murder of a law enforcement agent."' Part of the problem is
the extradition agreement between Mexico and the United
States, which does not require either state to surrender its citizens.3 2 Consistent with this Treaty, Mexico developed a rigid
policy against extraditing Mexican citizens to the United
States.33 Faced with this obstacle, U.S. law enforcement agents
relied on Court precedent recognizing the legality of state-sponsored abductions.3 4
A. ExterritorialRendition of Fugitive Suspects
Respect for state sovereignty is a fundamental tenet of interrangement between state agents for surrender of criminal suspect does not violate territorial sovereignty of asylum state). An informal agreement of this nature may in fact
authorize the abduction of a wanted offender from the jurisdiction of the asylum state,
provided that the asylum state agrees to this tactic. Id. at 127-28.
30. See Kristin Berdan Weisman, ExtraterritorialAbduction: The Endangerment of Future Peace, 27 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 459, 486 (1994) (noting that unauthorized abduction
violates state sovereignty whereas irregular rendition does not).
31. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992); United States v.
Matta-Ballesteros, 71 F.3d 754 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 939
F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1991).
32. Treaty, supra note 13, art. 9(1), at 5065. Article 9(1) provides that:
Neither Contracting Party shall be bound to deliver up its own nationals, but
the executive authority of the requested Party shall, if not prevented by the
laws of that Party, have the power to deliver them up if, in its discretion, it be
deemed proper to do so.
Id.
33. See Zagaris & Peralta, supra note 12, at 533-50 (describing Mexican law and
extradition procedures). As a general matter, Mexico's law on international extradition
limits the delivery of Mexican nationals to a foreign state except in "exceptional circumstances" and at the discretion of the Executive. "Ley de extradicion internacional,"
D.O., 29 de deciembre de 1975 (entered into force Dec. 30, 1975), art. 14. The Mexican constitution also provides, as do many other Latin American constitutions, that a
fair trial should take place under Mexican law in a Mexican court. CONST. art. 15
(Mex.).
34. See, e.g.,
Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 440 (1886) (holding that forcible abduction of criminal suspect did not impair power of court to prosecute him); Frisbie v.
Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952) (reaffirming Ker). From these cases arose the Ker-Frisbie
doctrine, the principle that jurisdiction over a defendant remains unaffected by the
unconventional manner of his arrest. See Keith Highet et al., International Decisions,
CriminalJurisdiction-ExtraditionTreaties-U.S. Government-SponsoredAbduction of Mexican Citizen: United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188, U.S. Supreme Court, June 15, 1992, 86
AM. J. IrNr'L L. 811 (1992) (suggesting that trial court may still prosecute criminal defendant regardless of whether government agents arranged his abduction).
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national law." Under the principal of extraterritoriality, 3 6 states
7
have the right to control what goes on within their borders.1
International law does not condone states resorting to unilateral
arrests of criminal offenders beyond their jurisdiction.3" Nevertheless, the international community recognizes that there may
39
be some. circumstances that justify such acts.
1. Male Caputs Bene Detentus
Extraterritorial arrests are based on the principle of male
captus bene detentus.4 ° Under this doctrine, federal courts may assert jurisdiction over defendants regardless of the manner of
arrest. 4 1 One method consistent with the principal of male captus
bene detentus is irregular rendition. 42 Another alternative is over35. See Kester, supra note 24, at 1454 (noting that international law limits states
from conducting unilateral arrests in foreign jurisdictions without consent).
36. See INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, supra note 3, at 165 (describing extraterritori-

ality as right of sovereign govenment to control:activities within state borders).
37. See Kester, supra note 24, at 1454 (arguing that respect for territorial sovereignty is fundamental tenet of international law).
38. See Jianming Shen, ResponsibilitiesandJurisdictionSubsequent to ExtraterritorialApprehension, 23 DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 43 (1994) (characterizing state's exercise of
police power in foreign jurisdiction as violation of territorial sovereignty).
39. See, e.g., Patrick M. Haggan, Government Sponsored ExtraterritorialAbductions in the
New World Order: The Unclear Role of InternationalLaw in United States Courts and Foreign
Policy, 17 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 438, 442 (1994) (discussing abduction of former
Nazi Adolf Eichmann from Argentina by Israeli law enforcement agents). Members of
the international community did not object when Israeli abductors seized Eichmann
from Argentina. Id. The U.N. Charter prohibits the use of force in foreign territory
unless the state perpetrating such acts has a valid claim of self-defense. U.N. CHARTER
art. 2,
4. According to the U.N. Security Council, this rule applies even where the
victim of the kidnapping is a notorious war criminal. See U.N. SCOR, 15th Sess., 868th
mtg., at 4, U.N. Doc. S/4349 (1960) (noting that resolution did not condone odious
crimes for which Eichmann was accused of perpetrating). The Security Council ordered Israel to make reparations to Argentina for abducting Eichmann from Buenos
Aires in 1960. U.N. SCOR, 15th Sess., 868th mtg., at 1, U.N. Doc. S/PV.868 (1960).
40. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE'FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 432 n.2 (1987). Loosely translated, the maxim suggests that a person improperly
seized may nevertheless properly be detained. Id.
41. Id.
42. See Abraham Abramovsky & Steven Eagle, U.S. Policy in Apprehending Alleged Offenders Abroad: Extradition,Abduction, or IrregularRentition?, 57 OR. L. REv. 51, 52 (1977)
(describing appeal of irregular rendition as one alternative to extradition). Irregular
renditions are secret agreements between law enforcement agents allowing states to
deliver fugitives quietly without invokingformal extradition procedures or the approval
of state executive authorities. Id.

1999]

U.S. -MEXICAN EXTRADITION POLICY

1071

seas abduction.4" Few states favor this method."
2. U.S.-Mexican Extradition Treaty
The Treaty is one of many extradition agreements that the
U.S. government has signed with foreign countries.4" The
Treaty lists thirty-one extraditable offenses punishable under the
federal laws of both states.46 It provides for certain exceptions to
extradition, such as the "specialty"4 7 and "political offense"4"
provisions. The Treaty also details specific procedures that the
state requesting extradition must follow. 9 Moreover, it provides
that the legislation of the requested state will govern the processing of that request.5
As a caveat, Article 9 of the Treaty does not require either
43. See id. (defining state-sponsored abductions as unilateral acts carried out under
color of law without consent of asylum state).
44. See Brigette Belton Homrig, Abduction as an Alternative to Extradition-A Dangerous Method to Obtain Jurisdiction over CriminalDefendants, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 671,
677 (1993) (explaining that international law prohibits overseas abduction as viable
method of arrest).
45. See Abramovsky, supra note 29, at 154 (explaining that U.S. government is currently party to 104 extradition treaties and multilateral agreements regarding extradition for specific offenses). The majority of these agreements are bilateral. See INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION,

supra note 3, at 49 (noting that U.S. government's almost exclu-

sive reliance on bilateral extradition treaties caused it i:o develop burdensome practice
of treatymaking). Each treaty contains specific provisions for extraditable offenses, procedural methods of transferring suspects, and evidentiary requirements for extradition.
Id. at 52.
46. Treaty, supra note 13, art. 2(3) & app., at 5062, 5076-78.
Even if the specific crime is not listed in the appendix, a treaty state must extradite
or prosecute if the crime involves a willful act that is punishable under the laws of both
countries by a deprivation of liberty for no less than one year. Zagaris & Peralta, supra
note 12, at 579.
47. Id. art. 17, at 5072-73. The doctrine of specialty stands for the proposition that
the requesting state, which secures the surrender of a person, may prosecute that person only for the offense for which the requested state surrendered that person. See
WORLD PUBLIC ORDER,

supra note 25, at 352-53 (noting rationale that requested state

could have refused extradition if it knew that requesting state would prosecute or punish defendant for offense other than one for which it granted extradition).
48. Treaty, supra note 13, art. 5, 31 at 5063-64. The Treaty leaves it up to the
Executive of the state from which extradition is requested to determine what constitutes
a political offense. Id. The political offense exception prohibits each state from surrendering a suspect for "political" crimes. See WORLD PUBLIC ORDER, supra note 25, at 38283 (defining political offense as conduct that manifests exercise in freedom of thought,
expression, and belief, freedom of association, and religious practice in violation of law
designed to prohibit such conduct).
49. Treaty, supra note 13, art. 10, at 5066-67.
50. Id. art. 13, at 5069.
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state to extradite its own citizens.5 1 Article 9(2) specifically
grants both states discretion whether to extradite criminal defendants.1 2 If the requested state chooses not to surrender a sus-

pect, however, then it must prosecute that individual under its
own laws, provided that the state requesting the transfer has jurisdiction over the offense.5 3
The option to extradite citizens under the Treaty created a
rift in U.S.-Mexican extradition policies. 4 Invoking the terms of
the Treaty, the Mexican regime opted against the surrender of
its citizens, preferring instead to prosecute them under its own
system ofjustice.55 U.S. officials, however, made it a practice to
deliver criminal offenders to the Mexican government'upon request, provided that the terms of the Treaty allowed such a trans56
fer.
Mexico's policy against extradition impeded combined efforts by Mexico and the United States to combat international
drug trafficking.57 The Mexican government's repeated denials
of U.S. extradition requests frustrated U.S. law enforcement attempts to apprehend suspects who fled to Mexico to avoid prosecution in U.S. courts.58 Reports of inefficiency and pervasive
51. Id. art. 9, at 5065. Article 9 gives both states the option to extradite their own
nationals, or in the alternative, to prosecute such persons under their own laws. Id.
52. Id. art. 9(2), at 5065. Article 9(2) specifically provides that: "[i]f extradition is
not granted pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article, the requested Party shall submit the
case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution, provided that Party
has jurisdiction over the offense." Id.
53. Id.
54. See Zagaris & Peralta, supra note 12, at 581 (concluding that provision granting
either state option to prosecute defendant as alternative to extradition encouraged
Mexican government's practice against extradition of Mexican citizens).
55. See Brief for the United States on Writ of Certiorari to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit at 21 n.17, United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 946 F.2d 1466
(9th Cir. 1991) (No. 91-712), rev'd, 504 U.S. 655 (1992) [hereinafter U.S. Brief] (explaining that Mexican government had not extradited one citizen when U.S. Supreme
Court decided Alvarez).
56. See Zagaris & Peralta, supra note 12, at 531-33 (describing backlog of U.S. extradition requests and Mexican government's reluctance to surrender suspects to U.S.
government).
57. See Abramovsky, supra note 29, at 207 (describing U.S. government's disappointment with Mexican law and perceived inexpediency of Mexican justice system).
58. See Reply Brief for the United States on Writ of Certiorari to the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit at 3, United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 946 F.2d 1466 (9th
Cir. 1991) (No. 91-712), rev'd, 504 U.S. 655 (1992) [hereinafter Government's Reply
Brief] (explaining right of U.S. government to vindicate sovereign interest in enforcing
state laws). The U.S. government argued that its interest in enforcing its criminal laws
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corruption among high-ranking members of the Mexican regime reaffirmed the U.S. government's mistrust of Mexico's justice system.5" These problems led to the controversial abduction
of Dr. Alvarez-Machain. 6
B. Federal Courts and State-Sponsored Abductions
U.S. federal courts have long held that forcible abduction of
a criminal defendant does not vitiate the government's right to
prosecute him under the laws of the United States.61 A judicially-sanctioned policy of extraterritorial abduction thus encouraged the U.S. government to engage in abductions to secure custody of foreign offenders.6 2 An exception to this policy
relieves courts of jurisdiction only in cases where government
agents exhibit conduct so extreme and outrageous as to shock
6
the conscience. 3
is manifest where a case involves the deliberate kidnapping, torture, and murder of a
U.S. law enforcement agent who was killed because of his official actions. Id. at 5.
59. See Juan M. Vasquez, U.S. Bitterness Lingers in Drug Ag~nt's Killing, L.A. TIMES,
Mar. 17, 1985, at 1 (alluding to claims by U.S. officials of evidence that high-ranking
Mexican police officials deliberately bungled Camarena investigation). In 1987, the
U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency ("DEA") implicated several prominent Mexican leaders
for their connection with one of Mexico's most notorious drug cartels led by kingpin
Rafael Caro-Quintero. See Jim Schachter, Widespread Camarena Case Bribery Alleged, L.A.
TIMEs, May 28, 1987, at 1 (describing multiple arrests of Mexican law enforcement officials). Among those charged were members of the Mexican Federal Judicial Police, as
well as members of the Mexican equivalent of the U.S. Secret Service and the FBI,
Governacion (integral security agency), state police agencies, Mexican customs, and the
Mexican military. Id. At the trial of Dr. Alvarez-Machain, one witness testified that
among those politicians present during the torture of Agent Camarena were Mexican
Defense MinisterJuan Arevalo Gardoqui, Interior Minister Manual Bartlett Diaz, Governor Enrique Alvarez del Castillo, Mexican Federal Judicial Police Director Manuel
Ibarra Herrera, and Mexican Interpol Director Miguel Aldana Ibarra. SeeJim Newton,
Camarena'sAbduction and Torture Described, L.A. TIMEs, Dec. 10, 1992, at BI (recounting
trial testimony of defendant implicated in murder of U.S. government agent).
60. United States v. Alvarez-Machan, 504 U.S. 655 (1992).
61. See, e.g., Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 444 (1886) (holding that extradition
treaty does not guarantee fugitive protection in foreign state); Frisbie v. Collins, 342
U.S. 519, 522 (1952) (noting that abduction by government agents does not deprive
court of power to try defendant).
62. See Abramovsky, supra note 29, at 160 (explaining that during five-year investigation of Camarena murder, DEA and U.S. Department of Justice concluded that they
could not secure arrest of numerous perpetrators through traditional process of extradition because of Mexico's long-standing hostility to extradition and implicated drug
leader's demonstrated ability to avoid arrest by Mexican authorities).
63. United States v. Toscanino. 500 F.2d 267. 275 (2d Cir. 1974).
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1. The Ker-Frisbie Doctrine
The Court recognized the legality of government-sponsored
abductions as early as 1886 in Ker v. Illinois. 64 This case stands

for the general principal that a defendant who is forcibly
brought before a court cannot challenge his indictment or conviction after a fair trial by asserting the impropriety of his
arrest. 65 The Court reaffirmed Ker in Frisbie v. Collins.6 6 In so
doing, it extended the application of Ker to cases involving interstate abductions. 67 As in Ker, the Frisbie Court held that the U.S.
Constitution does not require a court to permit a convicted
criminal to escape justice merely because of the unconventional
68
manner of his arrest.
Ker and Frisbieestablished the Ker-Frisbiedoctrine, the principal that an illegal arrest does not deprive federal courts of power
to prosecute fugitives. 69 Federal courts relied on this doctrine in
64. 119 U.S. at 436. In Ker, an Illinois state court indicted a U.S. citizen for larceny
and embezzlement, but the defendant fled to Peru in order to escape punishment. Id.
at 437. Upon request from the Governor of Illinois, the U.S. government issued a warrant for the defendant's arrest and sent an agent to Peru to retrieve him under the
terms of the extradition agreement between the United States and Peru. Id. When the
agent arrived in Peru, however, he was unable to serve the warrant because Chilean
forces had ousted the Peruvian government from power. Id. at 438-39. Because the
agent could not invoke the treaty, he kidnapped the defendant and returned him to
the United States. Id. The Illinois state court tried and convicted the defendant of
larceny. Id. The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed his conviction and held that his abduction did not violate the terms of the extradition treaty between the United States and
Peru. Id. at 440. The Court also rejected the defendant's claim that he had a right of
asylum in Peru. Id.
65. Id. The U.S. Supreme Court added that "there are authorities of the highest
respectability which hold that such a forcible abduction is no sufficient reason why the
party should not answer when brought within the jurisdiction of the court which has
the right to try him for such an offense, and presents no valid objection." Id. at 444.
66. Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. at 522. In Frisbie, a state prisoner seeking habeas
corpus in federal court alleged that his abduction from Chicago by state agents who
delivered him to a Michigan state court to stand trial violated the Due Process Clause of
the U.S. Constitution and the Federal Kidnapping Act. Id. at 520. The U.S. Supreme
Court unanimously rejected this claim. Id. In so doing, the Court extended the rule of
law in Ker, which dealt with international abductions, to interstate kidnappings. Id. at
522.
67. Id.
68. Id. The Court concluded that abduction of a suspect from one U.S. state in
order for that the suspect to stand trial in another state did not violate the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. The Court reasoned that due process is
satisfied once law enforcement agents apprise the accused of the charges against him,
afford him a fair trial in accordance with his rights under the Constitution, and subsequently convict him of a criminal offense. Id.
69. See INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, supra note 3, at 228 (describing origin ofjudi-
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upholding the legality of state-sponsored abductions in later decisions7 Courts almost unanimously follow Ker-Frisbie.7 1
2. The Toscanino Exception
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals created an exception
to the Ker-Frisbie doctrine in United States v. Toscanino.72 The Toscanino exception requires that a court divest itself of jurisdiction
where the government secures custody of a defendant through
acts that shock the conscience.7 3 In crafting the exception, the
court relied on post-Frisbie Court decisions74 that expanded the
due process guarantee to pre-trial conduct of law enforcement
75
agents toward criminal defendants.
U.S. courts have yet to encounter a case where the governcial precedent retaining jurisdiction over criminal defendant regardless of unconventional manner of arrest).
70. See, e.g., Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975) (upholding rule that illegal
arrest does not violate subsequent conviction); United States ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler,
510 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1975) (emphasizing that despite holding in United States v. Toscanino, Second Circuit continues to follow Ker-Frisbie line of cases unless defendant
posits strong showing of grossly cruel and unusual barbarities inflicted upon him by
U.S. agents); United States v. Lovato, 520 F.2d 1290 (9th Cir. 1975) (concluding that
defendant's allegations were nothing more than routine expulsion by Mexican officers
of undesirable alien, which did not warrant termination of defendant's prosecution for
violations of U.S. law); United States v. Lira, 515 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
847 (1975) (holding that absent direct evidence of misconduct by U.S. government,
forcible abduction of defendant following torture by Chilean police did not impair
court's power to bring defendant to trial on criminal charges); United States ex rel.
Calhoun v. Twomey, 454 F.2d 326 (7th Cir. 1971) (concluding that where court has
jurisdiction to prosecute defendant and holds him under valid process, it need not and
will not inquire into circumstances surrounding defendant's arrest).
71. See Abramovsky, supra note 29, at 205 (discussing background ofjudicial precedent acknowledging state-sponsored abductions).
72. 500 F.2d 267, 275 (2d Cir. 1974). In Toscanino, Uruguayan police working for
the U.S. government kidnapped the defendant, an Italian citizen, from his home in
Montevideo, Uruguay, and delivered him to Brazilian authorities. Id. at 269. The defendant claimed that Brazilian police tortured and interrogated him for seventeen days
before delivering him to the United States. Id. The defendant also alleged that U.S.
government agents were aware of these acts. Id.
73. Id. at 272-75. The court noted the impropriety of jurisdiction to prosecute a
suspect where law enforcement agents obtain custody over such person by employing
methods that constitute a "deliberate, unnecessary, and unreasonable invasion" of his
constitutional rights. Id. at 275.
74. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (prohibiting use of defendant
statements elicited without advising defendant of his constitutional rights); Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (holding that evidence obtained without warrant constituted
illegal search and seizure); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (expanding due
process to include pre-trial unlawful conduct of law enforcement agents).
75. See generally Rochin, 342 U.S. at 165.
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ment's conduct is so egregious as to trigger the exception's
"shock the conscience" requirement. 76 Indeed, U.S. courts have
strictly limited the exception to the most flagrant and intolerable
conduct of law enforcement agents towards fugitive suspects in
their custody. 77 Some courts have rejected the exception altogether.78 Federal jurisdictions have yet to apply the exception.7 9
The Ker-Frisbiedoctrine is still good law in most federal jurisdictions.8 0 Nevertheless, many diplomats and U.S. government
officials publicly oppose policies sanctioning state-sponsored abductions as violating customary international law.8 1 Foreign
tribunals, however, have upheld personal jurisdiction over de82
fendants seized from other states.

76. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62, 66 (2d Cir. 1975)
(finding lack of complex shocking governmental conduct sufficient to violate due process rights); United States v. Lira, 515 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 847 (1975)
(noting insufficient evidence to show that DEA agents were aware of unacceptable
harm to defendant); United States v. Cordero, 668 F.2d 32 (1st Cir. 1981) (upholding
federal courtjurisdiction over defendant despite treatment of defendant under custody
of government agents); United States v. Reed,.639 F.2d 896 (2d Cir. 1981) (upholding
jurisdiction to prosecute defendant absent evidence of severe mistreatment).
77. See, e.g., Cordero, 668 F.2d at 32 (ruling that harsh treatment of cocaine smuggler by DEA agents did not deprive court of jurisdiction to try him following informal
extradition through Venezuela); United States v. Marzano, 537 F.2d 257 (7th Cir. 1976)
(declining to inquire into circumstances leading up to arrest of defendant where facts
failed to indicate shocking and outrageous conduct).
78. See INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, supra note 3, at 230 (describing limited application of exception by federal courts).
79. See, e.g., Lira, 515 F.2d at 68 (finding insufficient evidence to show that DEA
agents knew of unacceptable harm to defendant where Chilean police tortured and
interrogated defendant); Reed, 639 F.2d at 896 (upholding jurisdiction over fugitive
suspects regardless of illegality of arrest).
80. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992); Cordero, 668
F.2d at 32; Reed, 639 F.2d at 896; United States v. Noriega, 117 F.3d 1206 (11th Cir.
1997); United States v. Chapa-Garza, 62 F.3d 118 (5th Cir. 1995); United States v. MattaBallesteros, 71 F.3d 754 (9th Cir. 1995).
81. See, e.g., FBI Authority to Seize Suspects Abroad: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Civil
and ConstitutionalRights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 37 (1989) (statement of Abraham D. Sofaer, former State Department Legal Advisor) [hereinafter FBI
Authority) (insisting that U.S. government supports policy suggesting that unconsented
arrests in foreign states violate principal of territorial integrity).
82. See, e.g., Re Argoud, 45 I.L.R. 90, 98 (Cass. crim. 1964) (Fr.) (denying
prosecutorial immunity for defendant abducted from Germany); Attorney General of
Israel v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 5, 6567 (D.C. 1961) (Isr.), aff'd 36 I.L.R. 277, 342 (S. Ct.
1962) (premising personal jurisdiction to prosecute abducted defendant on U.S. case
law).
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C. The Alvarez Decision
The abduction of Dr. Humberto Alvarez-Machain
("Machain") from Mexico eight years ago was the culmination of
an intensive manhunt following the kidnapping and murder of
Enrique Camarena, an undercover agent working for the U.S.
Drug Enforcement Administration ("DEA")." The U.S. government sought several suspects implicated in this case and made
deals with the Mexican police to bring these defendants to the
United States to stand trial.84 When these agreements failed, the
U.S. government authorized the abduction of three suspects
from Mexico.8 5 These arrests led to the Court's controversial
83. Alvarez, 504 U.S. at 657. Shortly before his death, Agent Camarena succeeded
in infiltrating one of the largest drug cartels in Mexico, led by kingpin Rafael CaroQuintero. See Abramovsky, supra note 29, at 160 (describing arrest of kingpin believed
to be responsible for murder of agent). DEA officials demanded Quintero's extradition
from Mexico. Id. Instead, Quintero escaped to Costa Rica, where police officials eventually arrested and deported him to Mexico to stand trial on a host of criminal charges.
Id. at 161-62. Authorities found the mutilated bodies of Agent Camarena and his pilot
in a Mexican field approximately one month after their abduction by drug cartel leaders on February 7, 1985. See United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 599, 602
(C.D. Cal. 1990) (describing how pilot assisted agent in locating and marijuana plantations). Authorities believed that Quintero and his accomplices kidnapped, tortured,
and murdered the agent and his pilot in retaliation for a devastating raid on the cartel
ordered by the DEA at Camarena's request. See Michael Hedges, Camarena Trial Begins;
Mexico Reopens Its Probe,WASH. TIMES, May 16, 1990, at A5 (explaining testimony of three
men at Quintero trial in 1988 describing torture, interrogation, and murder of agent).
84. Abramovsky, supra note 29, at 161-62.
85. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992) (depicting
seizure of defendant at gunpoint from Mexico); United States v. Matta-Ballesteros, 71
F.3d 754 (9th Cir. 1995) (concerning abduction of defendant from Honduras); United
States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1991) (describing irregular rendition of defendant from Costa Rica). The U.S. government did not request the extradition of these men from Mexico. See Abramovsky, supra note 29, at 161 (suggesting that
U.S. law enforcement agents favored abduction because of Mexico's set policy against
extradition of Mexican citizens). Moreover, one suspect had previously eluded arrest
by bribing Mexican police in Guadalajara. See Zagaris & Peralta, supra note 12, at 584
(describing how Rafael Caro-Quintero bribed Mexican police and fled to Costa Rica to
escape prosecution). Authorities eventually seized Quintero in Costa Rica and deported him to Mexico to stand trial. Abramovsky, supra note 29, at 162. Four years
after the arrest, a Mexican court convicted Quintero and twenty-three others, many of
whom were Mexican law enforcement agents of various criminal offenses, including the
murder of Agent Camarena and his pilot. SeeJAMES MILLS, THE UNDERGROUND EMPIRE:
WHERE CRIMES AND GOVERNMENTs EMBRACE 1155 (1986) (describing scandalous arrest
of Mexican government officials). A court in Mexico reportedly sentenced Quintero
and other drug traffickers to 40 years in prison for the murder of Agent Camarena, and
an additional 76 years for their conviction on kidnapping and drug trafficking charges.
See Zagaris & Peralta, supra note 12, at 585-86 (describing punishment as harshest
sentences permitted under Mexican law).
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ruling in Alvarez.8 6
1. The Abduction of Rene Martin Verdugo-Urquidez
Under the alleged authority of the U.S. government, Mexican police seized Rene Martin Verdugo-Urquidez shortly after
Rafael Caro-Quintero's arrest.8 v The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals applied a narrow reading of the Ker-Frisbie doctrine in
United States v. Verdugo.8 8 The court declined to extend Ker-Frisbie to cases involving abduction of non-U.S. citizens from foreign
jurisdictions protesting such acts.89 In so doing, the court gave
the defendant derivative standing to assert a violation of the extradition treaty only if the Mexican government protested his abduction.9 ° The court instead relied on existing Court precedent
in United States v. Rauscher,9 1 which held that a defendant may
raise an objection to personal jurisdiction if the government
prosecutes him for an offense other than that which secured his
extradition.9 2
86. 504 U.S. at 657.
87. See Abramovsky, supra note 29, at 162 (explaining that government of Mexico
could not prosecute Verdugo's abductors on kidnapping charges because U.S. law enforcement agents had already placed them in Federal Witness Protection Program).
88. 939 F.2d at 1345-49.
89. Id. In so doing, the court distinguished Ker from Verdugo. Id. at 1346. Ker was
a U.S. citizen, whereas Verdugo was a citizen of Mexico. Id. Ker's abductor seized him
without obtaining prior authorization from the U.S. government, whereas Verdugo's
captors arrested him at the behest of the U.S. government. Id. Accordingly, the Ninth
Circuit concluded that Ker stood only for the proposition that an abduction carried out
by private citizens did not violate the U.S.-Peru Extradition Treaty, and that Ker did not
address the question of state-sponsored abductions. Id. The court reasoned that even
if Ker did apply to state-sponsored abductions, Ker was still not dispositive because the
Peruvian government did not protest the defendant's abduction, unlike the Mexican
government in Verdugo. Id. The court also declined to extend Frisbie to Verdugo, noting
that Frisbie concerned a violation of the Due Process Clause and rights protected under
federal statute, whereas Verdugo addressed the question of an alleged violation of an
extradition treaty. Id. at 1347.
90. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d at 1341, 1356-58 (9th Cir. 1991).
Conversely, the Ninth Circuit noted that, even though the Treaty generally prohibits
state-sponsored abductions, the asylum state implicitly sanctions abductions if it fails to
protest such acts formally. Id. at 1352. The court added that should a Treaty violation
occur, the appropriate remedy is repatriation of defendant to Mexico. Id. at 1359-60.
The court remanded the case to the district court for an evidentiary hearing on
whether Mexico voluntarily surrendered the defendant to the United States. Id.
91. 119 U.S. 407 (1886).
92. Id. at 424. United States v. Rauscher limited the Ker-Frisbiedoctrine because the
manner of defendant's arrest was a central issue determining the validity ofjurisdiction.
Id.

1999]

U.S.-MEX!CAN EXTRADITION POLICY

1079

2. The Abduction of Dr. Humberto Alvarez-Machain
Further investigation of the Camarena murder implicated
Machain, a Mexican physician. 3 The U.S. government accused
Machain of injecting the agent with drugs to revive him so that
his captors could further interrogate and torture him about the
DEA's knowledge of the cartel's activities in Mexico.9 4 The DEA
initially engaged in informal negotiations with Mexican leaders
for the extradition of Machain from Mexico. 5 When these efforts failed, the DEA ordered Machain's abduction.9 6 Despite
Mexican opposition and demands for the defendant's return to
his home state, the case reached the Court in 1992. 9 '
The Court ultimately reversed the decisions of the trial
court and appellate court favoring the defendant.9" The district
court had determined that the DEA's abduction of Machain violated the Treaty and ordered the defendant's return to his country.9 9 The court refused to apply Ker-Frisbie to violations of treaty
93. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 657 (1992).
94. Id.
95. See United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 602 (C.D. Cal. 1990) (describing meetings between DEA and Mexican agents proposing possible exchange of suspects). In an initial meeting between DEA Special Agent Hector Berrellez, head of the
Camarena murder investigation, DEA Special Agent Bill Waters, Mexican Federal Judicial Police ("MFJP") Commandante Jorge Castillo del Rey, and an unidentified MFJP
official, Mexican leaders agreed to deliver the defendant to the United States in exchange for the DEA's deportation of a wanted Mexican citizen believed to have been
residing in the United States. Id.
96. See id. at 603 (describing abduction of defendant at gunpoint and transfer to
custody of U.S. law enforcement agents in Texas). in December 1989, MFJP Commandante Jorge Castillo del Rey contacted DEA informant Antonio Garate-Bustamente
to arrange a meeting with DEA officials to discuss the possible exchange of Machain for
Isaac Naredo, wanted by Mexican police for stealing large sums of money from Mexican
politicians. Id. at 602. In a meeting between DEA Special Agent Berrellez, DEA Special
Agent Waters, MFJP Commandante Castillo del Rey, and an unidentified agent of the
MFJP, Mexican officials agreed to deliver the defendant to the U.S. government in exchange for its promise to deport Naredo to Mexico. Id. Castillo del Rey assured the
DEA agents that the Mexican Attorney General had authorized this meeting and suggested that the arrangement to exchange suspects be kept secret. Id. Informal negotiations unraveled after Mexican officials demanded US$50,000 payment in advance to
cover the cost of transporting Machain to the United States. Id. When the DEA refused
to pay any money in advance for the operations, Mexican agents refused to deliver the
defendant as promised. Id.
97. See Alvarez, 504 U.S. at 657 (reversing decisions of district court and Court of
Appeals in favor of defendant).
98. Id.
99. See Caro-Quintero,745 F. Supp. at 609 (criticizing U.S. government's assertion
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law.1 °° In so doing, the court reasoned that because the Treaty
specifically provided for the extradition of foreign suspects, it
implicitly proscribed forcible abductions of such persons. 10 1
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed the
102
decision of the district court.

In a six to three opinion, the Court ruled that unilateral
abduction of the defendant from Mexico at the direction of U.S.

agents did not deprive the district court of jurisdiction to prosecute the defendant for his alleged crimes.10 3 The Court focused
specifically on whether the abduction violated the provisions of
the Treaty between Mexico and the United States1 4 It concluded that the Treaty did not expressly prohibit overseas
kidnappings by government agents beyond its terms.10 5
The Court also held that general principles of international
law provided no basis for interpreting the treaty to include an
implied term that precluded international abductions. 10 6 The
that procedures outlined in Treaty are not exclusive means of arrest of foreign defendants).
100. Id. The district court emphasized the significance of extradition treaties as
mutual agreements intended to preserve state sovereignty by restricting impermissible
state conduct. Id.
101. Id. at 610. The district court noted that the intent of extradition treaties was
to preserve territorial sovereignty by restricting impermissible state conduct. Id. The
court relied on the principle enunciated-in Rauscher, that the specific enumeration of
certain provisions in treaties implies the exclusion of all others. Id. at 614. The court
concluded that the U.S. government violated the Treaty and ordered the defendant's
subsequent release and return to Mexico. Id.
102. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 946 F.2d 1466 (9th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 504
U.S. 655 (1992).
103. Alvarez, 504 U.S. at 657.
104. Id. at 668-69. The U.S. Supreme Court focused on the language of the
Treaty. Id. at 655. It noted that Article 9 of the Treaty did not purport to specify extradition as the only way by which a state could secure custody of a citizen of another state
for purposes of prosecution under U.S. law. Id. at 664. Article 9 gives the U.S. government the right to request the extradition of Mexican citizens. Treaty, supra note 13, art.
9(1), at 5065. It also gives Mexico the option either to extradite citizens or to prosecute
them under its own laws. Id.
105. Alvarez, 504 U.S. at 664. The Court concluded that the Treaty said nothing
"about the obligations of the United States and Mexico to refrain from forcible abductions of people from the territory of the other nation, or of the consequences under the
treaty if an abduction occurs." Id. at 663.
106. Id. at 669. The Court opined that the negotiating history of the Treaty did
not evidence an intent to prohibit abductions under the Treaty. Id. Nor did abductions not within the scope of the Treaty violate its terms. Id. at 665. The Court acknowledged that the abduction was shocking and that it even violated general principles of international law. Id. The abduction, however, was not illegal. Id. The Court
explained that the U.S. government had informed Mexico, as early as 1906, of estab-
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majority opinion thus reaffirmed the Ker-Frisbie doctrine of male
captus bene detentus.10 ' Under these principles, the defendant's
abduction did not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction to prosecute him8for his crimes because his abduction did not violate the
10
Treaty.
The dissent argued that the decision constituted a direct violation of international law,109 and that the stated goals of the
Treaty clearly prohibit acts of transgression in foreign jurisdictions.1 10 Furthermore, the Treaty's detailed provisions with regard to extraditable offenses and procedures for extradition
clearly suggest that both parties intended to provide comprehenlished precedent in Ker and of the U.S. government's position that this doctrine applied
to forcible abductions conducted outside the terms of the Treaty. Id. The Court further noted that legal scholars drafted language explicitly forbidding abductions, but
that no such language appears in the text of the agreement. Id.
107. Id. at 657. The majority opinion accepted the U.S. government's claim that
Ker governed this case, and that Rauscher applied only where the defendant's arrest
violates the Treaty. Id. In Rauscher, the Court held that a court may prosecute a defendant only for those crimes that secured his extradition. 119 U.S. 407, 430 (1886).
The Court opined that the Treaty did not apply to Alvarez because the defendant's
abduction was not a proceeding under an extradition agreement. Alvarez, 504 U.S. at
657. A defendant could successfully challenge jurisdiction only if the Court found that
the government did violate the terms of the Treaty. See Paul Michell, English Speaking
Justice: Evolving Responses to TransnationalForcibleAbduction After Alvarez-Machain, 29 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 383, 405 (1996) (noting that majority's stated purpose was to determine
whether abduction violated Treaty provisions). Because there was no Treaty violation,
the rule in Ker prevailed, and a court need not inquire as to how the defendant came
before it. Id. The majority therefore assumed that Ker and Frisbie remained good law,
thus avoiding consideration of due process issues. Id.
108. Alvarez, 504 U.S. at 670. On remand, the district court acquitted the defendant because the government lacked sufficient evidence to prove the defendant's involvement in the kidnapping, torture, and murder of Agent Camarena and his pilot.
See Zagaris & Peralta, supra note 12, at 687 (explaining that acquittal of defendant precluded further trial or detainment of defendant).
109. Alvarez, 504 U.S. at 670 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice John Paul Stevens,
joined by Justices Harry Blackmun and Sandra Day O'Connor, criticized the decision
for sending a bad example to countries around the world. Id. Justice Stevens conceded
that there is no express promise by either party to refrain from seizing suspects from
foreign jurisdictions. Id. He warned, however, that viewing extradition treaties as providing merely optional methods of arresting alleged offenders creates a dangerous precedent. Id. For example, "[i]f the United States . . .thought it more expedient to
torture or simply to execute a person rather than to attempt extradition, these options
would be equally available because they, too, were not explicitly prohibited by the
treaty." Id. On its face, the agreement "appears to have been intended to set forth
comprehensive and exclusive rules concerning the subject of extradition." Id.
110. Treaty, supra note 13, pmbl, at 5061. The Treaty was designed to further the
cooperation of both states in the fight against crime and to render better assistance in
matters of extradition mutually. Id.
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sive and exclusive rules regarding the transfer of foreign citizens.1 1 The dissent concluded that the Treaty prohibited unilateral abductions.1 1 2 It also declined to apply the Ker-Frisbiedoctrine and warned that the Court's opinion set a bad precedent to
113
courts around the world.
3. The Abduction of Juan Ramon Matta-Ballasteros
In April 1988, U.S. Marshals seized Matta-Ballesteros from
Honduras and brought him to the United States where a California court convicted him of kidnapping and conspiracy in the
Camarena murder. 4 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals relied
on Alvarez in upholding the defendant's conviction in Matta-Bal111. Alvarez, 504 U.S. at 672-73 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent opined that if
the state requesting custody over a suspect could simply kidnap that person, all of the
provisions established in the Treaty would be utterly useless. Id. at 674. The Treaty is a
comprehensive document with twenty-three articles and an appendix detailing specific
offenses that are extraditable under its terms. Id. at 672-73. Justice Stevens suggested
that "[f]rom the preamble, through the description of the parties' obligations with respect to offenses committed within as well as beyond the territory of a requesting party,
the delineation of the procedures and evidentiary requirements for extradition, the
special provisions for political offenses and capital punishment and other details, the
Treaty appears to have been designed to cover the entire subject of extradition." Id. at
673-73 (emphasis added).
112. Id. at 672 n.4. The dissent reasoned that the Treaty could not further its goal
of fostering cooperation if it permitted state-sponsored abductions. Id.
113. Id. at 670. The dissent distinguished Alvarez from Ker and Frisbie. Id. In Ker,
there was no treaty violation because bounty hunters kidnapped the defendant. Id. In
Alvarez, however, the U.S. government breached its obligations under the Treaty because it authorized the abduction. Id. Additionally, this case was not analogous to Frisbie, which dealt with interstate abductions. Id. Quoting Justice Brandeis from Olmstead
v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (dissenting opinion), Justice Stevens warned
that:
In a government of laws, existence of the government will be "imperilled" [sic]
if it fails to observe the law scrupulously. Our Government is the potent, omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. Crime is contagious. If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds
contempt for the law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it
invites anarchy. To declare that in the administration of the criminal law the
end justifies the means-to declare that the Government may commit crimes
in order to secure the conviction of a private criminal-would bring terrible
retribution. Against that pernicious doctrine this Court should resolutely set
its face.
Id. at 686 n.33.
114. United States v. Matta-Ballesteros, 71 F.3d 754, 761-62 (9th Cir. 1995). The
defendant Matta-Ballesteros was a member of the drug cartel believed to have been
responsible for the murder of Agent Camarena. Id. On appeal, Matta-Ballesteros challenged the district court's jurisdiction to prosecute him on the grounds that his abduction violated the U.S.-Honduras Extradition Treaty. Id. at 762.
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lesteros.1 15 In so doing, the court departed from its previous
stance in Verdugo where it had refused to apply Ker-Frisbieto cases
involving state-sponsored abduction of non-U.S. citizens." 6 Citing Alvarez as authority, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the
terms of the U.S.-Honduras Extradition Treaty did not limit the
arrest of foreign citizens to extradition for purposes of prosecu7
tion."
II. U.S. EXTRADITION POLICY: REACTIONS TO ALVAREZ
The repercussions of the Court's decision in Alvarez
prompted considerable debate and widespread criticism from
the international community."' Critics accused the Court of
sanctioning a lawless policy." 9 Mexican leaders strongly pro20
tested the decision, calling it a violation of international law.'
115. Id. at 762. The Ninth Circuit, however, was troubled by the fact that U.S.
marshals seized the defendant from foreign territory. Id. at 762-63.
116. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d 1341, 1345-49 (9th Cir. 1991)
(distinguishing Ker from Verdugo and declining to apply Ker to cases where foreign government formally protests defendant's abduction).
117. Ballesteros, 71 F.3d at 763. The Ninth Circuit also declined to invoke its supervisory powers to dismiss the conviction because the defendant failed to demonstrate
shocking and outrageous governmental misconduct sufficient to warrant dismissal of
the conviction under the Toscanino exception. Id. at 764.
118. See, e.g., Neville Botha, Extradition v. Kidnapping: One Giant Leap BackwardsUnited States v. Alvarez-Machain, 19 S.AIR. Y.B. OF INT'L L. 219, 222 (1994) (noting that
Machain's alleged participation in brutal murder of U.S. agent does not provide justification for court to disregard duty to uphold rule of law); Betsy Baker & Volker Rioben,
To Abduct or To Extradite: Does a Treaty Beg the Question?, 53 ZEITSCHRIFT FAUR AusLAANDISCHES kOFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VAOLKERRECHT 657, 658 (1993) (Germany) (suggesting that by ignoring well-established and continued integration of international law
into U.S. law, U.S. Supreme Court failed to address decisive question of whether U.S.
courts should exercise jurisdiction over defendant forcibly abducted by government
agents).
119. See, e.g.,
Thomas F. Liotti, Alvarez-Machain Was a Vote for Anarchy, NAT'L L.J.,
Aug. 24, 1992, col. 3 (cautioning that by condoning kidnapping of Mexican citizen,
U.S. Supreme Court has declared open season on U.S. residents and citizens by foreign
countries); Jonathan Bush, How Did We Get Here? Foreign Abduction After Alvarez-Machain,
45 STAN. L. REV.939, 941-44 (1993) (warning that effect of Alvarez is creation of imperial presidency with unbridled power to act in deciding matters of foreign policy). One
scholar opined that the overall reaction to Alvarez from all over the world has "signal[led] a decline in tolerance for covert coercive activities across sovereign borders
generally and not just a particular low-point in U.S.-Mexico bilateral relations." See generally W. Michael Reisman, Covert Action, 20 YALE J. INT'L L. 419, 422 (1994).
120. See Brief for the United Mexican States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Mfirmance, United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S.Ct. 2188 (1992) (No. 91-712) (LEXIS,
Genfed Library, Brief file) [hereinafter Brief for Mexico] (describing Mexican government's request that U.S. counterpart provide relief in accordance with principles of
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In the United States, reaction to the decision was mixed. 12 1 Federal courts challenged the Court's construction of the Treaty in
post-Alvarez decisions. 2 2 The legislature held hearings and considered new law in response to the decision.12' The end result
was the negotiation and signing of a new extradition agreement
to prohibit transborder abductions.
A. InternationalResponse to Alvarez
The international community strongly opposed the Alvarez
decision.1 24 Mexican leaders threatened to terminate U.S.-Mexican law enforcement cooperation programs. 125 As a result, the
international law). Mexican leaders unsuccessfully petitioned for defendant's repatriation to his home country. Id.
121. See, e.g., Halberstam, supra note 10, at 745 (suggesting that decision regarding
conduct of foreign affairs properly falls upon executive and legislature as opposed to
judiciary); Timothy M. Phelps, Court OK's Seizing Suspects Abroad; Mexico Cuts Anti-Drug
Cooperation in Protest, NEWSDAY, June 16, 1992, at 4 (describing domestic and overseas
speculation regarding application of ruling to Libyan terrorists). Some commentators
and scholars praised the decision. See, e.g., Terry Eastland, Supreme Court Rightly Passes
the Ball, L.A. TIMES, June 18, 1992, at B7 (arguing that U.S. Supreme Court did not
approve abductions, kidnapping, or seizing of foreigners for trial as many claim; court
only approved power of executive to authorize such acts); Linda Jacobson, Court Decision Was Right, But U.S. Policy May Not Be, ATLANTA J. & CoNsT., June 17, 1992, at A18
(stating that executive branch is best suited to decide matters of foreign policy, not
courts). Others argued that the decision violated international law. See, e.g., A Victory for
Lawlessness, ST. Louis PosT-DISPATCH, June 17, 1992, at 2B (warning of potential for
terrorism by U.S. authorities abroad as implication of disregard for international law);
Breaking Treaties: High Court Gives the Green Light to Border Raids, SEATrLE TIMES, June 16,
1992, at A10 (urging that sovereign states should rely on treaties instead of force to
settle disputes); Herman Schwartz, The Supreme Court's Insult to Law-Abiding Countries,
L.A. TIMES, June 21, 1992, at MI (noting absurdity of detailed extradition treaty leaving
open question of permissibility of state-sponsored abductions).
122. See, e.g., United States v. Matta-Ballesteros, 71 F.3d 754, 771-72 (9th Cir. 1995)
(distinguishing case from Ker, Frisbie, and Alvarez); United States v. Matos, Crim. No. 95395, 1996 WL 104264, at *24 (D.P.R., Feb. 28, 1996) (holding that Dominican extradition treaty did not apply to defendant's violation of speedy trial claim based on failure
to request return to Puerto Rico); Sneed v. Tennessee, 872 S.W.2d 930, 935 (Tenn.
Crim. App. 1993) (concluding that law-of-land provision in state constitution prohibited state from acquiring jurisdiction over criminal defendant by conduct of government authorities so outrageous so as to shock conscience of court); Xiao v. Reno, 837 F.
Supp. 1506, 1547 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (noting that political questions doctrine did not
deprive district court of jurisdiction to prosecute alien defendant).
123. See, e.g., KidnappingSuspects Abroad, 1992: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Civil
and ConstitutionalRights of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 102nd Cong. 267 (1992) [hereinafter Kidnapping Suspects Abroad].
124. See Phelps, supra note 121, at 4 (describing massive protest of decision
abroad).
125. See generally Miller, supra note 20, at Al.
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United States and Mexico agreed to negotiate a new extradition
agreement prohibiting international abductions.12 6 Other countries threatened criminal prosecution of any persons who engaged or participated in international abductions in their juris127
diction.
1. Mexican Opposition
The Alvarez decision placed a serious strain on U.S.-Mexican
relations.1 28 The Mexican government temporarily suspended
government cooperation with DEA agents in Mexico.1 21 U.S.
leaders accused Mexican officials of corruption."' The Mexican
government denied allegations of corruption and protested the
decision as a transgression of basic principles of international
law.13 1 Mexican officials demanded a re-negotiation of the
Treaty and vowed to prosecute any individuals participating in
law enforcement activities on Mexican soil without prior authori126. See generally Aceves, supra note 8, at 101.
127. Id.
128. See Vicini, supra note 2 (describing protests from Mexican leaders); Stephen J.
Hedges et al., KidnappingDrugLords: The U.S. HasDone It for Decades, But It Rarely Causes
Trouble, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., May 14,1990 (describing diplomatic dispute between
Mexican and U.S. governments). Prior to Alvarez, Mexico and the United States were
close to signing NAFrA. See Paul Iredale, U.S. Supreme Court Ruling Chills Relations with
Mexico, REUTERS N. AM. WiRE,June 16,1992 (explaining that relations between Mexican
and U.S. governments had improved with negotiation of NAFTA).
129. See Tim Golden, After Court Ruling, Mexico Tells U.S. Agents to Halt Activity, N.Y.
TIMES, June 16, 1992, at A19 (describing program of joint cooperation between Mexican and U.S. governments in fight against drug trafficking). The U.S. and Mexican
governments had entered into several agreements designed to improve efforts to combat drug trafficking. See, e.g., Agreement on Cooperation in Combating Narcotics Trafficking and Dependency, Feb. 23, 1989, U.S.-Mex., T.I.A.S. No. 11,604 [hereinafter Narcotics Treaty]; Treaty on Cooperation for Mutual Legal Assistance, Dec. 9, 1987, U.S.Mex., 27 I.L.M. 443, 447 [hereinafter Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty].
130. See Gabriela D. Lemus, U. S.-Mexican Border Drug Control Operation Alliance as a

Case Study, in

DRUG TRAICKING IN THE AMERICAS

61 (Bruce M. Bagley & William O.

Walker, III eds., 1994) [hereinafter DRUG TRAFFICKING] (suggesting validity of allegations of official corruption). Official corruption is such a prevalent problem in Latin
American countries that twenty-one countries, including Mexico and the United States,
signed a protocol organized by the Organization of American States concerning governmental corruption in Latin America. See World Politics and Current Affairs, ECONOMIST, Apr. 6, 1996, at 41.
131. See, e.g., Tim Golden, Mexicans Mollified over Drug Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, June 18,
1992, at A3; David Clark Scott, U.S. Court Ruling Provokes Heated Mexican Retort, CHISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, June 17, 1992, at 1. Mexican leaders demanded the arrest and
extradition of persons involved in the abduction. See Tod Robertson, Mexico Seeks DEA
Agents on Charges of Kidnapping,WASH. POST, Dec. 16, 1992, at Al0 (describing Mexican
demands for extradition of persons who orchestrated abduction of defendant).
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2

a. Suspension of Cooperation in the War Against Drugs
Perhaps a more serious problem evidencing the impact of
the ruling on U.S.-Mexican relations was the Mexican Government's suspension of cooperative efforts with the United States
to control illegal drug trafficking. 133 Mexican leaders temporarily banned all DEA activities in Mexico, and demanded a re-negotiation of its Treaty with the United States.1 3 1 Mexican leaders
later revoked the ban on DEA activity in Mexico after U.S. officials agreed to consider amending the agreement to prohibit
1 35
further abductions in Mexico.
b. Reports of Corruption Among Mexican Leaders
In the midst of the Camarena investigation, reports of pervasive corruption among high-ranking leaders of the Mexican regime impeded U.S.-Mexican efforts to curtail drug trafficking in
Mexico.13 6 Narcotics traffickers freely engaged in their trade by
bribing corrupt Mexican police and politicians.1 3 7 Reports of arrests of prominent Mexican leaders further evidenced the diffi132. See Golden, supra note 131, at A3 (describing Mexican government's demands for extradition of defendant's abductions).
133. See Sharon LaFraniere, Baker Offers Reassurances After Court Kidnap Ruling,
WASH. PosT, June 17, 1992, at A2 (describing Mexican government's temporary suspension of cooperation with U.S. efforts to combat international crime).
134. Neil A. Lewis, U.S. Tries to Quiet Storm Abroad over High Court's Right to Kidnap,
N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 1992, at A8.
135. LaFraniere, supra note 133, at A2.
136. See Symposium, supra note 17, at 427-28 (describing attempts by Mexican law
enforcement agents to obstruct DEA investigation of Camarena murder). At the trial of
Dr. Machain, the U.S. government alleged that prior to the abduction of Agent
Camarena, there were a series of meetings at which Mexican officials planned the
agent's abduction. Id. at 428. The U.S. government further claimed that Mexican officials assigned many of the same participants in these meetings to investigate the agent's
disappearance. Id. One suspect, for example, eluded arrest by bribing Mexican police
in Guadalajara. Zagaris & Peralta, supra note 12, at 585. Mexican police arrested drug
cartel leader Rafael Caro-Quintero two days after police discovered the bodies of Agent
Camarena and his pilot, but Quintero escaped to Costa Rica. Id. The authority in
charge of arresting Quintero later admitted to accepting a US$275,000 bribe in exchange for allowing Quintero to escape from an airport in Guadalajara. Id. Authorities
in Costa Rica subsequently arrested Quintero and deported him to Mexico. Abramovsky, supra note 39, at 162.
137. See Lemus, supra, note 130, at 426 (suggesting that allegations of official corruption may be grounded because U.S. investigations have been subverted by officials
who delayed procedures, giving defendant under arrest opportunity to escape).
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culties that U.S. law enforcement officials encountered with extradition requests and attempts to secure custody over criminal
defendants from Mexico.13 8 Official corruption is a prevalent
problem in Mexico and other Latin American countries.1 39 In
1992, twenty-one countries, including Mexico and the United
States, signed a protocol at the direction of the Organization of
American States ("OAS")' 4 ° addressing governmental corrup1 41
tion in Latin America.
2. The International Community's Response
Foreign governments strongly protested the Court's ruling
in Alvarez.1 4 2 Canadian leaders questioned the status of the U.S.Canada extradition treaty and threatened criminal prosecution
for individuals participating in transborder abductions from Canadian soil.143 Latin American governments, in particular, ex138. See 139 Cong. Rec. H6964 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1993) (statement of Sen.
Brown) (questioning whether U.S. government would ever contemplate abducting fugitives if Mexican law enforcement agents were willing to cooperate in arrest of criminal
defendants). At the trial of Dr. Machain, one witness testified that among those politicians present during the torture of Agent Camarena were Mexican Defense Minister
Juan Arevalo Gardoqui, Interior Minister Manuel Bartlett Diaz, Governor Enrique Alvarez del Castillo, Mexican Federal Judicial Police Director Manuel Ibarra Herrera, and
Mexican Interpol Director Miguel Aldana Ibarra. See Newton, supra note 59, at BI
(describing witness testimony at trial of Mexican doctor).
139. See World Politics and CurrentAffairs, supranote 130, at 41 (discussing impact of
drug trade on effectiveness of Mexican law enforcement structures).
140. Id.
141. See generally Lewis, supra note 134, at A8 (reporting protests against U.S.
Supreme Court ruling by Mexico, Canada, and Argentina); The Alvarez-Machain Decision, 3 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE DISPATCH 614, 615 (1992) [hereinafter U.S. DEP'T OF STATE]
(noting that U.S. Department of State was inundated with protests from Colombia, Canada, Bolivia, Paraguay, Uruguay, Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Jamaica, and Spain). Foreign
governments warned that they would challenge the lawfulness of such abductions in
international forums. Id.
142. See Shocking Ruling from U.S. Court, ToRoiro STAR, June 17, 1992, at A20.
Canada filed an amicus curiae brief with the U.S. Supreme Court arguing for the release of Dr. Machain. Id.
143. See, e.g., Kidnapping Suspects Abroad, supra note 123, at 112 (prepared statement of Alan J. Kreczko, Deputy Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State) (describing
Colombian government's suggestion that although Alvarez addressed treaty between
United States and Mexico, it really threatened legal stability of all public treaties); Reaction to U.S. Supreme Court Decision Endorsing Right to Kidnap Foreignersfor Prosecution in
U.S., NORTH-SOUTH AM. & CARIBBEAN POL. A.,

June '50, 1992, WL 2410586, at *1 (not-

ing Argentina justice minister's description of decision as historic regression in criminal
law); John McPhaul, Costa Rica Throws Out U.S. Extradition Treaty, MIAMI HERALD, Jan.

16, 1993, at A24 (describing Costa Rican Supreme Court's invalidation of U.S.-Costa
Rica Extradition Treaty); Up to 20 Years in Jail Proposed for Hondurans who Aid DEA

1088

FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 22:1064

pressed their opposition by refusing to cooperate with U.S. extradition requests. 4 4 Upon request from the presidents of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay, the InterAmerican Juridical Committee of the OAS issued an opinion
that characterized the abduction as a serious violation of public
international law and impermissible transgression of Mexico's
territorial sovereignty.

14 5

The U.S. government also received formal protests from
China, Columbia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Malaysia, and Venezuela. 1 46 In November 1992, participants at the Ibero-American Summit Conference, 1 47 which took place in Madrid in July 1992, formally requested that the U.N. General Assembly submit the issue to the
International Court ofJustice' 4 8 ("ICJ") for an advisory opinion
Kidnappings, NOTIMEX, Aug. 2, 1992 (explaining Honduran legislature's enactment of
mandatory jail sentences on Honduran citizens participating in DEA abductions);
Hernan De J. Ruiz-Bravo, Monstrous Decision: Kidnapping is Legal, 20 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 833, 836 (1993) (referring to Bolivian vice president's characterization of decision
as illogical and unilateral measure in violation of international law).
144. See Bruce Zagaris & Constantine Papavizas, Using the Organization of American
States to Control InternationalNarcotics Trafficking and Money Laundering, 57 REv. INT'L DE
DROIT PENAL 119, 120 (1986) (describing Organization of American States ("OAS") as
regional organization of states from North America, South America, Central America,
and Caribbean). Members of the OAS include nearly every country in the Western
Hemisphere. Id. One of the major objectives of the OAS is to solve common legal
problems. Id. Another purpose includes the promotion of member states' economic,
social, and cultural development. See generally 0. CARLOS STOETZER, THE ORGANIZATION
OF AMERICAN STATES

1, 33 (2d ed. 1993).

145. See Legal Opinion of the Inter-AmericanJuridicalCommittee on the Decision of the U.S.
Supreme Court in the Alvarez-Machain Case, reprinted in 13 HuM. RTs. L.J. 395 (1992) (separate opinion of Jorge Reinaldo Vanossi). The Inter-American Juridical Committee
("Committee") noted that "if the principles involved in the decision in question were
taken to their logical consequences, international juridical order would be irreversibly
damaged by any state that attributes to itself the power to violate with impunity the
territorial sovereignty of another state." Id. at 397. The Committee recommended that
the U.S. government return Dr. Machain to Mexico. Id.
146. See Aceves, supra note 8, at 120 (describing international opposition to scope
of Alvarez decision).
147. Id. Representatives from 19 Latin American countries, as well as Portugal and
Spain, attended the conference, which took place in Madrid. Id.
148. Id. at 178 (citing Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945,
arts. 65, 59 Stat. 1055, 1063). The U.N. Charter established the International Court of
Justice ("ICJ") as the principal judicial organ of the United Nations. U.N. CHARTER art.
7(1). Article 65 of the Statute of the International Court ofJustice authorizes the ICJ to
give an advisory opinion on any legal question at the request of whatever body may be
authorized in accordance with the U.N. Charter to make such request. Statute of Inter-
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regarding the legality of international abductions.14 The U.N.
General Assembly considered this issue but did not address the
international legal consequences that should apply to states that
engage in international abductions. 5 °
B. Domestic Opposition
In the United States, critics accused the Court of compromising the integrity of the law and inviting anarchy in the conduct of international relations:' 5 1 They warned of the repercussions of the decision on U.S.-Mexican efforts to promote international cooperation to deter international crime, such as
terrorism and drug trafficking.1 52 The extent of domestic opposition to the decision prompted executive leaders to temper
their initial reaction to the ruling in their favor.1 5 1 Congress
held hearings on the issue of transborder abduction policy in
the United States and considered legislation to prohibit U.S.
154
government agents from participating in such acts.
national Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 65, 59 Star. 1055, T.S. No. 993, 3 Bevans
1179, 1191 (1945).
149. U.N. Doc. A/47/249 (1992). A memorandum accompanying the request
urged that unilateral measures in which the U.S. government applied its own rule of law
to foreign jurisdictions was an exercise of coercive power that violated fundamental
principles of international law. Id.
150. See Virginia Morris & M. Christiane Vrailas Bourloyannis, The Work of the Sixth
Committee at the Forty-Eighth Session of the U.N. GeneralAssembly, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 607, 620
(1995) (describing adoption of draft decision that promised continued consideration
of international abduction issues at later sessions). At the Forty-eighth Session of the
U.N. General Assembly, there was a general consensus on three issues: (1) international law prohibits a state from exercising its criminal jurisdiction in foreign territory
unless the other state has consented to such act; (2) the use of unilateral measures,
such as the abduction of a suspected criminal from another state for trial before the
national courts of the abducting state, undermines existing mechanisms for international cooperation in the apprehension and prosecution of criminal offenders, as well
as treaty obligations to prosecute or to extradite such offenders; and (3) the General
Assembly should request that the ICJ render all advisory opinion to confirm and to
expound upon the rule prohibiting the extraterritorial exercise of criminal jurisdiction,
particularly through the use of unilateral measures of coercion such as abductions. Id.
151. See Aceves, supra note 8, at 102 (describing domestic and international responses to Alvarez). Many questioned what the U.S. government's response would be if
foreign law enforcement agents abducted U.S. citizens in violation of U.S. territorial
sovereignty. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 127.
154. Id.
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1. The Legal Community's Response to the Decision
Many legal scholars strongly criticized the Court's ruling
and generally denounced international abductions.' 5 5 They
warned that the decision would undermine U.S.-Mexican extradition policy.1 56 A central purpose of the Treaty between Mexico and the United States was to preclude unilateral abductions
in foreign territory. 1 57 Permitting state-sponsored abductions in
certain circumstances ultimately undermines the spirit, purpose,
and validity of extradition agreements. 158 Other commentators
warned that the decision invited retaliation on U.S. citizens by
59
other countries1
Critics also accused the Court of sanctioning an impermissible violation of international law.' 60 Customary international
law,16 ' independent of treaties or other agreements, prohibits
forcible abductions. 62 In these circumstances, critics urged that
the appropriate remedy was for the U.S. government to order
155. See, e.g., Bush, supra note 119, at 971 (positing that real significance of Alvarez
lies not in its impact on international policing, but in its support of aggressive executive
power); Michael J. Glennon, State-Sponsored Abduction: A Comment on United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 86 AM.J. INT'L L. 746, 748 (1992) (suggesting that effect of Alvarez was to
shield executive branch from compliance with fundamental international norms);
Ethan A. Nadelmann, The Evolution of United States Involvement in the InternationalRendition of Fugitive Criminals, 25 N.Y.U. J. Ir'u L. & POL. 813, 882-85 (1993) (noting that
developed legal methods of facilitating surrender of foreign criminal defendants between states evidence less need for resort to unilateral abductions).
156. See generally Bush, supra note 119, at 939. The following scholars testified
before U.S. Congress at hearings held in response to the decision: Michael Abbell,
Michael Glennon, Andreas Lowenfeld, Steven Schneebaum, and Ralph Steinhardt.
Kidnapping Suspects Abroad, supra note 123, at 13, 45, 62, 153, 171.
157. See Aceves, supra note 8, at 129 (describing critics' assertion that international
abductions contravene spirit and purpose of extradition agreements).
158. Id.
159. See, e.g., Liotti, supra note 119, col. 3; Phelps, supra note 121, at 4.
160. See Michell, supra note 107, at 412 (criticizing majority for failing to take into
account customary international law prohibiting forcible abductions). Another critic
warned that the decision gave U.S. agents unrestricted power to seize suspects from
foreign soil. SeeJanelle M. Diller, KidnappingForeign Citizens, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
June 26, 1992, at 18 (suggesting that court vested executive branch with unforseen new
powers).

161. See I

OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW:

PEACE

388-89 (9th ed. 1992) (defin-

ing customary international law as established practice of cooperation and comity between states).
162. See Michell, supra note 107, at 436 (suggesting that appropriate remedy for
violation of territorial sovereignty is dependent upon whether injured state protests and
requests return of fugitive).

1999]

U.S. -MEXICAN EXTRADITION POLICY

1091

the repatriation of Machain to Mexico. 16 3
Some scholars supported the Alvarez decision.' 6 4 They
pointed to the prevalence in drug trafficking, and corruption
among high-ranking leaders of the Mexican regime. 1 65 These
problems made extradition from Mexico a cumbersome and
66
inefficient process for the surrender of criminal defendants.1
2. The U.S. Government's Response
Executive leaders initially supported the decision in their
favor.1 67 They argued that the acts attributed to Machain were
of sufficient magnitude so as to compel his abduction and subsequent prosecution under the U.S. justice system.1 6 ' They also
163. Aceves, supra note 8, at 129.
164. See generally Halberstam, supra note 10, at 76; Gurul6, supra note 10, at 457;
Matorin, supra note 11, at 907; Michael J. Weiner, The Importance of a Clear Rule for
JudicialDeference to Executive Interpretationsof Treaties: A Defense of United States v. AlvarezMachain, 12 Wisc. INT'L L.J. 125 (1993). .'
165. See Lemus, supra note 130, a. 426 (discussing corruption and bribery of Mexican law enforcement authorities).
166. See Dea Abramschmitt, Neighboring Countries, Unneighborly Acts: A Look at the
ExtraditionRelationships Among the United States, Mexico and Canada, 4J. TRANSNAT'L L. &
POL'Y 121, 128 (1995) (arguing that rise in irregular apprehension over past twenty
years is attributable to such factors as increase in terrorist acts and drug trafficking, as
well as domestic elements that retard or impede extradition).
167. See Public Affairs, U.S. Dep't ofJustice, Statement of the Attorney General on AlvarezMachain Ruling, U.S. NEwswIRE, June 15, 1992, availablein LEXIS, News Library, Wires
File (describing initial positive response to decision by executive leaders of U.S. government). Soon after the U.S. Supreme Court announced its decision, Attorney General
William Barr released the following statement:
We are gratified by the Supreme Court's favorable decision in the AlvarezMachain case. The court's ruling vindicates the position we have taken from
the outset in this case. The decision represents an important victory in our
ongoing efforts against terrorism and narcotraffickers who operate against the
United States from overseas. We are anxious to proceed with the trial of this
individual for his role in the torture and murder of DEA Agent Camarena.
[Olur general policy remains cooperation where possible with foreign governments on law enforcement matters. In that regard, we are pleased to note that
the mutual cooperation between the governments of Mexico and the United
States in fighting the scourge of illegal drugs has been excellent in recent
years, and we believe it will continue to improve.
Id.
168. Kidnapping Suspects Abroad, supra note 123, at 104-05. In his testimony before
the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights, Abraham Sofaer,
former Legal Advisor to the State Department, opined that international abductions
may be appropriate under limited circumstances, such as self-defense or to protect
against gross violations of human rights. Id. The magnitude of the alleged acts in Alvarezjustified the U.S. government's response. Id. At a 1985 congressional hearing, however, Sofaer was more critical of transborder abductions. Id. He stated:
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suggested that the seriousness of the crime and that the U.S. government's need to respond overrode any violation of territorial
sovereignty in this case. 6 9
Prior to Alvarez, the Bush Administration asserted sweeping
legal powers to circumvent formal extradition agreements in
conducting overseas arrests of fugitives. 7 ' The U.S. government
increased U.S. drug-combat forces abroad and expanded the
rules of permissible conduct that applied to such agents. 171 The
extent of domestic opposition to Alvarez, however, prompted the
U.S. government to temper its initial enthusiasm about the deci72
sion.1
Can you imagine us going into Paris and seizing some person we regard as a
terrorist ... ? [H]ow would we feel if some foreign nation-let us take the
United Kingdom-came over here and seized some terrorist suspect in New
York City, or Boston, or Philadelphia . . . because we refused through the
normal channels of international, legal communications, to extradite that individual?
See generally Bills to Authorize Prosecution of Terrorists and Others who Attack U.S. Government
Employees and Citizens Abroad: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Security and Terrorism of the
Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 62-63 (1985),
169. See generally Kidnapping Suspects Abroad, supra note 123, at 104-05. Alan
Kreczko, Legal Advisor in the State Department, assured Congress that the decision did
not signal a fundamental change in U.S. policy. Id. Rather, it merely reaffirmed the
judicial principle that U.S. courts maintain jurisdiction over criminal defendants regardless of how such defendants came before the court. Id. He noted that the U.S.
government would not categorically rule out transborder abductions in the future. Id.
Extreme cases, such as the harboring of terrorists, may compel such action. Id.
Kreczko suggested that the government follow some type of strict interagency procedure before authorizing any abductions. Id. at 105. These procedures would force the
leaders to consider issues of international law, sovereignty, and foreign policy carefully
before taking such action. Id.
170. See Jeremy Campbell, Now Lockerbie Suspects Face Kidnap by US., ASSOCIATED
NEWSPAPERS LTD.,

June 16, 1992, at 18 (describing sentiments by former U.S. Attorney

General that ruling cleared legal obstacles that might have prevented U.S. agents from
seizing suspects implicated in Pan Am Flight 103 disaster in Lockerbie, Scotland). The
Bush Administration justified the legality of international abductions in extraordinary
cases, citing the right of self-defense, the President's inherent powers to conduct foreign affairs, and the need to combat terrorism and international narcotics trafficking.
See FBIAuthority, supra note 81, at 68 (statement of William P. Barr, Assistant Attorney
General).
171. See Hedges et al., supra note 128 (suggesting that U.S. government generally
favored overseas abductions because such acts avoided lengthy delays of extradition
proceedings and dealings with corrupt foreign law enforcement leaders).
172. See Marjorie Miller & Douglas Jehl, U.S., Mexico Ease Tensions on Court Ruling,
L.A. TIMES, June 17, 1992, at Al. Hours after Barr's announcement, White House Press
Secretary Marlin Fitzwater released a statement that sought to minimize the impact of
the Court's ruling. Id.; see Statement by Press Secretary Fitzwater on the Supreme CourtDecision
on the Alvarez-Machain Case, 28 WKLY. COMP. PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 1063 (June 15,
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In response to heightened criticism, the Bush Administration promised to refrain from future overseas abductions and
promoted a policy of international cooperation. 7 3 To Congressional leaders, President Bush's promise to refrain from future
abductions was not enough. 174 Consequently, the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights held hear1 75
ings on international abductions.
One Senator warned that the U.S. government's preference
for unilateral abductions would alienate U.S. allies and thereby
17 6
endanger international efforts to control criminal activity.
Congressional leaders proposed legislation to prohibit transborder abductions.1 77 One representative introduced a bill that
would deprive courts of jurisdiction to prosecute defendants ab1992) [hereinafter FitzwaterStatement] (emphasizing U.S. policy of international cooperation). The statement suggested in part that:
[t] he United States believes in fostering respect for international rules of law,
including in particular the principles of respect for territorial integrity and
sovereign equality of states .... Neither the arrest of Alvarez-Machain nor the
recent U.S. Supreme Court decision reflects any change in this policy ..
[Tihe United States has informed Mexico that following the arrest of AlvarezMachain, the United States has taken additional steps to ensure that U.S. law
enforcement activities overseas fully take into account foreign relations and
international law.
Id. at 1063.
173. See Fitzwater Statement, supra note 172, at 1063 (promising U.S. government's
commitment to international law and future interagency review of unilateral acts by law
enforcement agents abroad). Former President George Bush pledged to Mexican President Salinas that the U.S. government would neither conduct, encourage, nor condone abductions from Mexico. 138 CONG. Rc. S14123 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1992) (statement of Sen. Moynihan).
174. See, e.g., U.S. Lawmaker Callsfor BarringForcibleAbductions Overseas, CENT. NEWS
AGENCY, July 10, 1992 [hereinafter U.S. Lawmaker] (describing attempts by one U.S.
Senator to persuade Congress to adopt legislation prohibiting U.S. government from
engaging in overseas abductions).
175. See KidnappingSuspects Abroad, supra note 12"3 (describing proposed legislation
prohibiting overseas abductions).
176. 138 CONG. REc. S14123 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1992) (statement of Sen. Moynihan). Citing a noted expert on extradition law, Senator Moynihan remarked:
Not only is the position of the administration and of the Supreme Court legally and morally wrong, but, ironically, it is also antithetical to the long-term
law enforcement interest of the United States ....
[T]he decision to embrace
kidnapping is harmful to law enforcement, not helpful. It will not assist the
United States in combating crime. On the contrary, it will diminish the very
international cooperation against crime which is essential to success against
drug traffickers and other criminals.
Id.
177. See Symposium, supra note 17, at 422 (discussing various proposals barring
U.S. agents from engaging in overseas abductions).
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ducted from states that have extradition treaties with the U.S.
government. 1 78 Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan proposed a similar resolution that provided that the United States should pursue
law enforcement activities only within the existing international
1 79
legal framework, including extradition treaties.
Some legislators warned that the legalization of international abductions would destroy the objectives of U.S. international narcotics control efforts in Mexico.' 8 0 Senator Moynihan
178. See U.S. Lawmaker, supra note 174 (describing proposal by California Congressman, Leon E. Panetta). The proposed bill provided:
Section 1. SHORT TITLE. This Act may be cited as the 'International Kidnapping and Extradition Treaty Enforcement Act of 1992.'
Section 2. PROHIBITION ON PROSECUTION OF UNLAWFULLY ABDUCTED PERSONS.
(a). IN GENERAL.-A person who is forcibly abducted from a foreign place
which has in effect an extradition treaty with the United States(1) by the agents of a governmental authority in the United States for the
purposes of criminal prosecution; and
(2) in violation of the norms of international law; shall not be subject to
prosecution by any governmental authority in the United States.

(b)

FOREIGN GOVERNMENT CONSENT.-An

abduction is not, for purposes of

this section, a violation of the norms of international law if the government of the foreign place consents to that abduction, but such consent
may not be implied by the absence of a prohibition on such abductions in
a treaty regarding extradition.
138 CONG. REC. H6019 (daily ed. July 7, 1992) (statement of Rep. Panetta). The bill
sought to restore respect for state sovereignty and to promote the view that extradition
treaties are intended to provide states with formal procedures for the arrest of fugitive
suspects. Id.
179. 138 CONG. REC. S14123 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1992) (statement of Sen. Moynihan). The resolution noted that the Supreme Court's ruling in Alvarez recognized the
legality of transborder abductions. Id. It added, however, that the U.S. government
also has an interest in strengthening respect for the rule of law and the system of extradition treaties. Id. The legislation observed that the Iranian Parliament approved legislation authorizing Iranian officials to seize U.S. citizens anywhere in the world if they
are alleged to have violated Iranian law. Id. The bill provided that anyone who attempts to kidnap a U.S. citizen for alleged violations of foreign law will be deemed to
have committed a crime in the United States and be dealt with accordingly. Id.
180. 138 CONG. REC. S11505 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1992) (statement of Sen. Simon).
One representative opined that the decision was a major setback to newly strengthened
cooperative efforts between the U.S. and Mexican governments in combating illegal
narcotics activity. 138 CONG. REC. H2698 (daily ed. June 16, 1992) (statement of Rep.
Kolbe). He noted that:
Mexico is helping us win the war on drugs. Our two nations have signed numerous counter-narcotics agreements, our law enforcement agencies share intelligence and cooperate like never before, and even our respective military
organizations are working together on combating illegal drugs. We cannot
allow this newfound anti-narcotics relationship to evaporate as a result of the
Supreme Court's decision.
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introduced a bill in the Senate specifically addressing this problem.181 The proposed legislation sought to amend Section
182
481 (c) of the Foreign Assistance Act.'
3. U.S. Federal Courts
Some courts declined to extend Alvarez to other cases raising similar questions of extradition. 83 In Sneed v. State of Tennes181. S. 3250, 102d Cong. (1992). Section 1 of the proposed legislation noted that
close cooperation between the United States and other states is essential to combat
international crime. Id. It recognized, however, that the abduction of Dr. Machain at
the direction of the DEA and the Supreme Court's subsequent ruling cast doubt on the
validity of over one hundred extradition agreements to which the United States is a
party. Id. Significantly, Senator Moynihan, who was highly critical of the Mexican judiciary in the past, strongly opposed the Court's decision in Alvarez. 138 CONG. REC.
S14123 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1992) (statement of Sen. Moynihan).
182. S. 3250, 102d Cong. (1992). The bill provided in pertinent part:
Section 2. AMENDMENT TO SECTION 481 (c) OF THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT.

Section 481 (c) shall of the Foreign Assistance Act is amended to read as follows:
(1) PROHIBITION ON DIRECT ARREST AND ABDUCTION.(A) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no officer, agent or employee of the United States may effect an arrest in any foreign country as part of any foreign police action; and
(B) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no officer, agent or employee of the United States Government may authorize, carry out or
assist, directly or indirectly, the abduction of any person within the
territory of any foreign state exercising effective sovereignty over such
territory without the express consent of the state.
Section 3. EXCEPTION FOR VIOLATIONS OF THE LAws OF WAR.
Section 481 (c) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 is amended by adding at
the end thereof the following new provision:
(7) This subsection does not prohibit the seizure of any official, agent, or employee of a state during armed hostilities for purpose of bringing such
person to trial for violations of internationally recognized laws of war.
Section 4. SANCTION FOR VIOLATION.
Section 481 (c) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 is amended by adding at
the end thereof the following new provision:
(8) A person brought to the United States in violation of subsection (1) (b)
hereof shall not be prosecuted by the United States Government if the
state in which such abduction occurred objects and in the event of such
objection such person shall be promptly returned to the state in which the
abduction occurred.
Id.
183. See, e.g., United States v. Matos, Crim. No. 95-395, 1996 WL 104264, at *4
(D.P.R., Feb. 28, 1996) (declining to apply extradition treaty to failure to request return
to home state); Sneed v. Tennessee, 872 S.W.2d 930, 935 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993)
(holding that state constitution prohibited state from securing custody of criminal defendant by governmental conduct so outrageous as to shock conscience of court); Xiao
v. Reno, 837 F. Supp. 1056, 1057 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (ruling that political questions doc-
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see,18 4 the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals characterized
state-sponsored abductions as conduct so outrageous as to shock
the conscience of the court." 5 Similarly, the district court in
Xiao v. Reno.. 6 rejected the U.S. government's assertion that alle-

gations of shocking conduct involving foreign states are political
questions under the ruling of Alvarez, thereby depriving the
court of jurisdiction to hear defendant's claims for relief.'8 7
For the most part, appellate courts adopted the ruling of
Alvarez." 8 In United States v. Chapa-Garza,s9 the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that formal extradition proceedings initiated against the defendant did not invalidate his arrest or the
district court's power to prosecute him for his crimes. 9 ° The
court cited Alvarez as controlling authority for the proposition
that the extradition treaty did not govern the legality of the defendant's abduction.' 9 ' More recently, the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals ruled in United States v. Noriega'92 that the detrine did not deprive district court of power to hear claims of alien who was paroled
into United States to testify at heroin conspiracy trial).
184. 872 S.W.2d at 933.
185. Id.
186. 837 F. Supp. at 1546.
187. Id. The difference between Xiao and Alvarez was that the latter dealt with a
narrow question of treaty construction, not with whether governmental actions motivated by political agendas deprive the court ofjurisdiction to prosecute defendants. Id.
188. See, e.g., Kreimerman v. Casa Veerkamp, 22 F.3d 634, 643 (5th Cir. 1994) (applying Alvarez treaty interpretation in holding that Inter-American Convention on Leeters Rogatory did not preempt all other conceivable means for serving defendants residing in Mexico); United States v. Chapa-Garza, 62 F.3d 118, 120 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding
that extradition treaty did not govern legality of forced abductions and that abduction
did not deprive district court of jurisdiction to prosecute defendant); United States v.
Noriega, 117 F.3d 1206, 1213 (lth Cir. 1997) (refusing to reverse convictions on
ground that U.S. Government seized defendant in violation of extradition treaty);
United States v. Puentes, 50 F.3d 1567 (11th Cir. 1995) (reading Alvarez as holding that
extradited defendant has standing under doctrine of specialty to raise any objections
that requested state may claim and that defendant's ability to raise claim under doctrine of specialty does not depend on requested state objecting to jurisdiction); United
States v. Trujillo, 871 F. Supp. 215, 220 (D. Del. 1994) (holding that arrest of defendant
did not amount to "de facto" extradition).
189. 62 F.3d at 120.
190. Id. at 120-21.
191. Id. The Court in Alvarez noted that the Treaty with Mexico did not prohibit
abductions outside of its terms. Id. The Treaty only precluded such acts if the asylum
state raised a formal objection. Id. In Chapa-Garza,because Mexico did not protest the
defendant's abduction, the defendant lacked standing to assert a violation of the
Treaty. Id. at 121.
192. 117 F.3d at 1213. U.S. law enforcement agents seized Noriega in a military
invasion of Panama. Id.
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fendant failed to demonstrate that the U.S. government affirmatively agreed not to seize fugitives from Panama, either expressly
through its extradition treaty with Panama or by established
19 3
practice under that instrument.
C. U.S.-Mexican Extradition Policy Since Alvarez
In 1993, one year after the Court issued its ruling in Alvarez,
the U.S., Canadian, and Mexican governments signed NAFTA,
virtually eliminating economic barriers between the three countries.' 9 4 The debate over NAFTA prompted Congress to review
U.S.-Mexican extradition policies since Alvarez and the impact of
NAFTA on the transfer of criminal defendants between the two
countries. 95 On November 23, 1994, U.S. and Mexican leaders
signed the Transborder Abduction Treaty. 1 96 In 1997, the Clinton Administration approved certification of Mexico for state aid
despite evidence of political corruption by drug traffickers
among influential
and prominent leaders of the Mexican gov97
ernment.
1. Transborder Abduction Treaty
Bilateral negotiations between U.S. and Mexican leaders in
response to Alvarez resulted in the signing of the Transborder
Abduction Treaty.' 9 8 Under this agreement, either state may
193. Id. The Eleventh Circuit noted that in order to prevail on an extradition
treaty violation claim under Alvarez, the defendant must show by reference to the express language of the treaty or established practice thereunder, that the U.S. government affirmatively agreed not to seize fugitives from the territory of its treaty partner.
Id. Noriega failed to meet this burden. Id.
194. NAFTA, supra note 21, pmbl. NAFTA proposed to liberalize trade in goods
and services, to expand investment opportunities in the United States, Canada, and
Mexico, and ultimately to strengthen cooperation between the three countries. Id.
195. See Laurie L. Levinson, NAFTA: A Criminaljustice Impact Report, 27 U.C. DAVIs
L. REv. 843 (1994) (describing congressional debate over criminal effects of NAFTA).
While the stated purpose of NAFTA is to ensure the prosperity of the U.S., Canadian,
and Mexican economies, its effects flow beyond economic consequences. Id.
196. Transborder Abduction Treaty, supra note 22.
197. See Steven Erlanger, Risking Dissent, U.S. Is Expected to Waive Drug Sanctions
Against Colombia, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 1998, at A6 (suggesting that Mexico's special status as U.S. government's close partner in NAFTA aided in formation of close relationship between Mexican and U.S. leaders purporting to expand extradition of drug traffickers).
198. See 139 CONG. REc. H6964, H6965 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1993) (describing negotiations between U.S. and Mexican leaders on more effective extradition practices). In
return for an end to state-sponsored abductions, the U.S. government asked that Mexi-

1098

FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 22:1064

prosecute or request the extradition of any persons responsible
for engaging in transborder abductions in its jurisdiction. 199 If a
party has reason to believe that the other state authorized a
transborder abduction within its boundaries, then it may trigger
a fact-finding inquiry into the matter. 20 1 If the inquiry reveals
that such an act occurred, then the requested state must
promptly return the abducted defendant to the petitioning
state.2 ° Upon the return of the abducted defendant to that
state, the state that surrendered him may then formally demand
his extradition.20 2 The requested state must either extradite this
person under the Treaty or submit the case to its proper authorities for prosecution under its own laws. 20 3
The signing of the Transborder Abduction Treaty signifies a
renewed effort by both governments toward improvement of extradition policies.20 4 The agreement, however, is not legally
binding on either state.20 5 To date, the Clinton Administration
has yet to submit the agreement to the U.S. Senate for ratifica206
tion.
2. NAFTA: Above and Beyond Economic Trade
With the reduction of economic barriers between the
United States and Mexico, extradition has become a critical issue. 20 7 The potential for increased criminal activity on the economic scale as a result of NAFTA suggested the need to develop
a more aggressive policy on extradition. 20 8 Frustrated efforts by
U.S. law enforcement agents to secure jurisdiction over criminal
can officials consider extraditing their citizens to U.S. law enforcement agents upon
request. Id.
199. Transborder Abduction Treaty, supra note 22, art. 6, at A-676.5. The Transborder Abduction Treaty protects the rights and obligations of the U.S. and Mexican
governments. Id. art. 7. Private individuals do not have standing to assert violations
under this agreement. Id.
200. Id. art. 4, at A-676.4.
201. Id. art. 5, at A-676.4-676.5.
202. Id. art. 5(3), at A-676.5.
203. Id.
204. Zagaris & Peralta, supra note 12, at 592.
205. See id. (explaining that Clinton Administration deliberately withheld submission of agreement for ratification).
206. Id.
207. See Rita Patel, One More Effect of NAFTA-A MultilateralExtradition Treaty?, 14
DICK. J. INT'L L. 153, 154 (1995) (explaining importance of extradition now that three
governments share common borders).
208. Id.
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defendants in Mexico was a source of discord that threatened
the ratification of NAFTA in the U.S. legislature.2 °9
Discussions between U.S. and Mexican leaders over NAFTA
gave the U.S. government an opportunity to encourage a change
in Mexican extradition policy. 21 0 The Mexican government's
policy against extradition of Mexican citizens to the United
States and the United States' dissatisfaction with Mexico's justice
system was a source of contention that Congress addressed in the
context of commercial trade considerations. 2 11 Hearings on the
ratification of NAFTA focused primarily on two cases demonstrating the Mexican government's unwillingness to extradite
Mexican suspects or, in the alternative, to apprehend such persons in a timely and expedient fashion.2 1 2
3. Drug Trafficking, Corruption, and State-Aid
In 1997, the Clinton Administration opted to re-certify Mexico for state aid in the joint campaign by Mexico and the United
States to fight drug trafficking. 213 This decision prompted Con209. See CongressionalHearingon NAFTA Brings into Focus Mexico-U.S. ExtraditionRelations, 9 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 476-77 (Dec. 1993) [hereinafter NAFTA Hearing]
(suggesting that ability of felons to elude capture by Mexican authorities evidenced
inability of Mexican justice system to deal adequately with potential for increase in criminal activity resulting from proposed trade agreement between U.S. and Mexican governments).
210. 139 CONG. REC. H6964 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1993). One Senator urged that at
the very least, U.S. negotiators should secure binding guarantees from Mexican leaders
ensuring the vigorous pursuit, arrest, and prosecution of suspected felons who flee to
Mexico in order to avoid prosecution in the United States. Id.
211. Id. The general view suggested that seeking better cooperation from the
Mexican government would encourage other states seeking preferential ties with the
U.S. government to expect more cooperation in law enforcement and criminal justice
matters. Id.
212. See NAFTA Hearing, supra note 209, at 476-31 (discussing testimony of agent
supervisor from California Department of Justice, Mexican Liaison Program before
House of Representatives Committee on Government Operations). In the first case,
police in California requested the extradition of Serapio Zuniga Rios, a Mexican citizen, on charges of child molestation, including rape and sodomy, burglary, assault with
a deadly weapon, and other sex crimes. Id. at 479. It was only after the U.S. Secretary
of State brought this case to the attention of Mexican President Salinas in light of U.S.
debates over the ratification of NAFTA that the Mexican government finally arrested
the defendant on December 17, 1993. Id. at 480. In the second case, Juan Navaro
Lerma fled to Mexico after he killed a woman in a California parking lot on February
14, 1993. Id. at 481. To date, Mexican authorities have yet to apprehend the defendant. Id.
213. See Parker & Gallagher, supra note 15, at Al (describing Mexico as prime
destination for money laundering, drug-related street crime, and pervasive corruption).
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gress to re-assess extradition policies between the two governments.2 1 4 Evidence at Congressional hearings and debates considering the matter revealed increased drug trafficking and polit215
ical corruption in Mexico.
a. Certification of State-Aid to Mexico
Section 490(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act 216 requires the

U.S. President to certify that Mexico has fully cooperated with
the U.S. government or taken adequate steps on its own to combat drug trafficking. 21 7 In support of the President's decision to
grant recertification to Mexico, the U.S. State Department
claimed that Mexico's 1996 counter-drug measures yielded encouraging results and notable progress in bilateral cooperation.21 8 Increased drug trafficking and extensive corruption
among prominent law enforcement and political leaders continues to obstruct anti-drug measures, including extradition.21 9
b. The Problem of Corruption
Corruption among high-ranking leaders of the Mexican
214. See 143 Cong. Rec. S2581 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 1997) (statement of Sen. Coverdell) (describing proposed legislation addressing impact of drug cartels in cities spanning Western Hemisphere).
215. See, e.g., 143 CONG. REc. H954 (daily ed. Mar. 13, 1997) (statement of Sen.
Brady).
216. Foreign Assistance Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2291 (1994 & Supp. 1997).
217. Id.
218. 143 CONG. REc. at S2581. Technically, the U.S. Department of State's claim
that drug seizures and arrests increased in 1996 is true. Id. There was a slight increase
in drug seizures and arrests of drug traffickers in 1996 compared to seizures and arrests
in 1995. Id. An examination of Mexican drug seizures from 1992, however, suggests
otherwise. Id. Mexico's recent seizure of 23.6 metric tons of cocaine was slightly higher
than the 1995 figure, but was just half of the 46.2 metric tons of cocaine that Mexican
law enforcement agents seized in 1993. Id. Drug arrests also decreased by more than
fifty percent since 1992 even though they increased by a modest five or ten percent in
1996 over 1995. Id.
219. See Parker & Gallagher, supra note 15, at Al (suggesting that Mexican officials
acknowledge pervasive corruption). The DEA estimates that seventy-five percent of all
cocaine, up to eighty percent of all foreign-grown marijuana, and ninety-percent of the
chemicals used to make the drug "speed" flows through Mexico before entering the
United States. See George Miller, Miller Introduces Bills to Force Mexico to Take StrongAntiDrug Trafficking Steps, Gov'T PREss RELEASES, Feb. 2, 1996 (urging legislature to enact
proposed bill prohibiting certification of Mexico for state-aid unless it can show efforts
to eradicate drug smuggling, money laundering, and government corruption). In
1997, Mexican officials fired more than seven hundred Mexican federal police officers
because of corruption. Id.

1999]

U.S. -MEXICAN EXTRADITION POLICY

1101

government is a significant problem affecting Mexico's law enforcement policy. 22 0 The arrest in February 1997 of General
Jesus Gutierrez Rebollo, head of the Mexican drug law enforcement agency, for accepting bribes from leaders of Mexican drug
cartels is one example of this problem.2 21 In 1996, the Mexican
Attorney General dismissed more than 1,200 Mexican federal
law enforcement officers on charges of corruption.2 2 2 Mexican
drug cartels continue to engage2 23in trade with minimal interference from Mexican authorities.
4. Mexico's Extradition Policy
As of 1996, the U.S. government had over 165 pending extradition requests with Mexico.22 4 Until that time, the Mexican
government consistently denied U.S. extradition requests for
eio
policy
Mexican citizens wanted for various crimes. 2251 Mexico's
on extradition stems in large part from Article IV of the Mexican
Constitution, which prohibits the government of Mexico from
extraditing its own nationals.22 6 The existence of the death penalty in the United States is also an important factor contributing
to Mexico's reluctance to extradite its citizens. 227 The government of Mexico refuses to extradite suspects who could potentially face the death penalty in the United States.228
220. See 143 CONG. REc. S2582 (describing problem of corruption in Mexican law
enforcement and military ranks).
221. Id.
222. Id. at S2582.
223. See 143 CONG. REc. S2037 (describing influence of drug cartels on Mexican
government agents). In an hour-long interview, drug cartel leader Quintero told the
Washington Post: "I go to the banks, offices, just like any Mexican. Every day I pass by
roadblocks, police, soldiers, and there are no problems. I'm in the streets all the time.
How can they not find me? Because they're not looking for me." Id.
224. See Miller, supra note 219 (describing legislation prohibiting extension of aid
to Mexico, including re-certification for anti-drug campaign).
225. See Zagaris & Peralta, supra note 12, at 530-31 (describing historical context of
Mexican policy disfavoring extradition of Mexican nationals).
226. CONST. art. 4 (Mex.).
227. See "Ley de extradicion internacional," D.O., 29 de deciembre de 1975 (entered into force Dec. 30, 1975), art. 10(v) (stating preference for severe incarceration as
substitution for death penalty, when feasible); see also, Treaty, supra note 13, art. 8, at
5065 (prohibiting extradition of criminal defendant where capital punishment is effective in requesting State and laws of requested State do not permit capital punishment
for any offense).
228. See, e.g., Adolfo Garza, "Spooky"Killer Won't Be Sent Back to U.S., THE NEWS, Oct.
2, 1997 (discussing Mexican government's refusal to extradite citizen charged with four
counts of murder on grounds that defendant could face death penalty if prosecuted in

1102

FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 22:1064

As a step toward changing this policy, the government of
Mexico began by expelling Juan Chapa Garcia, a Mexican citizen, to the United States in 1995 on charges of drug trafficking. 229 On April 26, 1996, Mexican President Ernesto Zedillo
broke established precedent by authorizing the extradition of
two Mexican nationals to the United States. 2 ° This incident was
the first time that the government of Mexico invoked the "exceptional circumstances" provision in Mexico's International Extradition Law to justify the extradition of its own nationals.23 l Since
these two cases, Mexican authorities have agreed to extradite six
more defendants in 1997, including several on drug-related offenses.

232

III. ALTHOUGH IMPROVED RELATIONS BETWEEN THE
U.S. AND MEXICAN GOVERNMENTS ILLUSTRATE A TREND
TOWARD MORE COOPERATION IN LAW ENFORCEMENT,

THE U.S. GOVERNMENT SHOULD ADOPT A MORE
AGGRESSIVE STANCE TOWARD MEXICAN EXTRADITION

PRACTICE AND POLICY
Predictions about the negative impact of Alvarez on U.S.Mexican extradition relations were premature and have not
been unrealized. The Alvarez decision encouraged U.S. legislators to question and to scrutinize the utility of extradition as an
U.S. courts), Mexican officials did offer to extradite David "Spooky" Alvarez if U.S.
authorities promised to revoke death penalty if he was found guilty. Id.
229. See Zagaris & Peralta, supra note 12, at 612 (noting that U.S. district court
indicted Garcia of participation in organized crime activities involving illicit narcotics
trafficking).
230. See Bruce Zagaris, Mexico Extradites Two Nationals to the United States, 12 INT'L
ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 220 (1996) (describing extradition of Francisco Gamez Garcia on
charges of child molestation and Aaron Morel LeBaron on murder accusations).
231. See 143 CONG. REc. S2035, S2040 (daily ed. Mar. 10, 1997) (statement of Sen.
Feinstein) (explaining that Mexico has never extradited Mexican nationals to U.S. government on drug charges under exceptional circumstances provision). Mexico's International Extradition Law restricts the Mexican government from delivering Mexican
nationals to a foreign country except in exceptional circumstances and at the discretion
of the executive. See generally "Ley de extradicion internacional," art. 14. Article 9 (1) of
the Treaty reaffirmed this doctrine by giving both states discretion to extradite their
citizens. Treaty, supra note 13, art. 9(1), at 5065. The Mexican government relied on
this provision to justify its historical reluctance to extradite its own nationals. See
Zagaris & Peralta, supra note 12, at 536 (discussing structure and mechanics of Mexican
extradition law).
232. See 143 CONG. REc. at S2040 (urging U.S. leaders to adopt more aggressive
stance on drug aid to Mexico).
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effective mechanism for overseas arrest of foreign criminal defendants. 23 3 The signing of the Transborder Abduction
Treaty, 2 4 the ratification of NAFTA, 235 and the Mexican government's recent willingness to extradite its nationals under the exceptional circumstances doctrine 236 evidences a trend toward
more cooperation between both governments. Significantly, the
Clinton Administration's recent decision to re-certify Mexico in
a joint effort to combat narcotics trafficking prompted Congress
once again to evaluate the merits of current extradition relations
between both countries. 23 ' Legislative debates over the re-certification issue revealed some impediments to extradition created
by the drug trafficking problem and pervasive corruption among
high-ranking leaders in the government of Mexico. 231 In all of
these circumstances, the U.S. government was in a unique position to use its bargaining power to change Mexican extradition
policy, but failed to do so.
A. Legislative ProposalsProhibitingthe U.S. Government from
Engaging in Overseas Abductions Were Ineffective Because the Real
Problem Lies in the Discretion to Extradite Under the Treaty
The failure to agree on an acceptable course of action suggests that legislators overlooked the real underlying problem in
Alvarez. Mexico did not have any incentive to extradite its own
citizens to the United States. 2 9 Legislators feared that the U.S.
government's occasional resort to unilateral abductions would
233. See supra notes 172-84 and accompanying text (discussing legislative proposals
proscribing further U.S.-sponsored unilateral abductions in Mexico).
234. See supra notes 198-206 and accompanying text (explaining that Treaty provides each state with remedy of requesting extradition of persons responsible for engaging in unilateral abduction in their jurisdiction).
235. See supra notes 207-12 (describing how debate over ratification of NAFTA
prompted U.S. Congress to re-examine utility of extradition as viable mechanism for
dealing with problems that might potentially arise from increase in criminal activity
resulting from elimination of trade barriers).
236. See supra notes 230-31 and accompanying text (discussing recent extradition
of two Mexican nationals under rarely invoked doctrine in Mexico's Extradition Law).
237. See supra notes 214-15 and accompanying text (explaining concerns of U.S.
legislative officials toward increased drug trafficking and corruption in Mexico).
238. See supra notes 219-23 (discussing examples of Mexican law enforcement officials arrested on charges of bribery and corruption in connection with influence of
Mexican drug cartels).
239. See supra notes 51-60 (discussing both effect of provision in Treaty giving both
states discretion on extradition and Mexican government's preference for alternative to
extradition).
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alienate U.S. allies and thereby jeopardize efforts to forge better
cooperation with Mexico in the fight against international
crime.2 40 Proposed legislation would have deprived courts'of jurisdiction to prosecute criminal defendants abducted from other
states.24 ' Hence, Alvarez had the positive effect of encouraging
24 2
Congress to reassess its policy on extradition with Mexico.
Unfortunately, proposed legislation prohibiting state-sponsored
abductions abroad failed to target the cause of the problem in
Alvarez that arose from the option to extradite a state's citizens
243
under Article 9(1) of the Treaty.
B. The TransborderAbduction Treaty Fails to Address the Option to
Extradite Under the Treaty
Like the Treaty, the underlying problem with the Transborder Abduction Treaty is that it does not give Mexico any incentive to extradite its own nationals to the United States upon
request. Additionally, the Transborder Abduction Treaty punishes the party whose laws were violated in the first place by allowing criminal offenders to escape punishment under the laws
of that country.
The U.S. government should renegotiate the Treaty to require extradition where all of the applicable grounds and procedures under the agreement apply in the particular circumstance.
The intent of the Treaty was to ensure that prosecutors could
recover criminals who flee the laws of either state.2 4 4 The Treaty
contemplates good faith and mutual cooperation in the exchange of criminal offenders.2 45

Mexico's policy against the ex-

tradition of its nationals demonstrated a lack of good faith and
willingness to cooperate with the U.S. government in these mat240. See supra notes 174-82 and accompanying text (illuminating concerns that decision by U.S. Supreme Court was antithetical to long-term law enforcement interests of
U.S. government with Mexican counterpart).
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. See supra notes 51-60 and accompanying text (suggesting that problem lies in
Treaty giving both states option to extradite and not obligating either state to deliver
fugitive where fugitive is citizen of that state).
244. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text (explaining intent of Treaty and
principles of international law in promotion of comity and cooperation in exchange of
criminal suspects).
245. Id.
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C. While the U.S. Government Cannot Force Mexico to Change Its
Laws, It Can and Should Use Its Influence to Pressure
Mexico into ChangingIts Policy on Extradition
If the U.S. government can assert the power to enter into a
foreign country and seize a person from the territory of that
state, it can alternatively influence Mexico to adopt a change of
policy. The Treaty governs extradition procedures in Mexico.2 4 7
Mexico's Law on International Extradition governs in the absence of an extradition treaty.2 48 Revising the Treaty is one alternative. Influencing a change in Mexican law prohibiting the extradition of Mexican nationals to the United States because of
the death penalty is another. The government of Mexico has
reluctantly demonstrated its willingness to alter its policy on extradition by invoking the "exceptional circumstances" doctrine
in its laws.2 49 The U.S. government should seize this opportunity
to establish a new policy on extradition with Mexico by exploring the scope of this doctrine.
D. Congress Should Have Used NAFFA as a BargainingChip to
PressureMexico to Change its Policy Against
Extradition of Mexican Nationals
Negotiations on NAFTA presented a unique opportunity for
the U.S. government to solicit some concessions from Mexico on
law enforcement issues, including extradition. The U.S. government's inability to reach Mexican criminal defendants overseas
was a vital issue that threatened the ratification of NAFTA in
Congress.2 50 At the very least, U.S. leaders were in a position to
secure binding guarantees from their Mexican counterparts that
they would vigorously pursue, arrest, and prosecute any suspected felons who fled to Mexico to avoid prosecution under
246. See supra notes 167-69 (explaining sentiments by U.S. executive leaders that
Alvarez decision reflected seriousness of murder of U.S. government agent).
247. See supra notes 35-54 and accompanying text (outlining provisions of Treaty).
248. See supra note 33 and accompanying text (suggesting that consistent with
Treaty, Mexican government developed rigid policy against extradition of Mexican nationals).
249. See supra notes 229-32 and accompanying text (describing extradition of two
Mexican citizens in 1996).
250. See supra notes 207-12 (exploring role of extradition in elimination of trade
barriers between U.S., Mexican, and Canadian states).
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U.S. laws. 2 5'

They could have used the proposed trade agreement as leverage to pressure Mexican authorities into changing
25 2
their policy on extradition, but they failed to do so.
Hearings on the ratification of NAIFTA focused specifically
on two high profile cases illustrating the potential influence that
negotiations over NAFTA had on the Mexican government's will253
ingness to pursue a policy of effective law enforcement.
NAFTA created a new opportunity for cooperation and change
in many of the economic and law enforcement policies between
both states. 254 The elimination of trade barriers raises genuine

concerns about the increased potential for economic criminal
activity and flow of drugs from Mexico into U.S. cities. 25 5 Bilateral consultations between U.S. and Mexican officials can effect
substantive changes instead of one-sided concessions by the U.S.
government to refrain from engaging in overseas abductions.25 6
NAFTA remains a promising venue open to the U.S. government
to seek a change in Mexican policy on extradition.
E. The Key to Improving U.S.-Mexican ExtraditionRelations Lies in
the Fight Against Drug Trafficking and Corruption in Mexico
The U.S. government should use its bargaining position
with Mexico in the fight against international drug trafficking by
conditioning certification of Mexico on marked improvement in
extradition procedures. The U.S. government's recent re-certification of Mexico demonstrates the extent to which increased
narcotics trafficking and prevalent corruption among high-ranking leaders of the Mexican government continue to obstruct extradition between the two countries. 25 7 Corruption is perhaps
251. See supra notes 210-11 (suggesting that NAFIA gave U.S. leaders incentive to
impress upon Mexican government primacy of rule of law in addition to commercial
trade considerations).
252. See supra note 212 (describing frustration of U.S. leaders with Mexican regime's consistent refusal to honor U.S. extradition requests and failure to punish criminal defendants effectively under applicable Mexican law).
253. See id. (discussing Mexican law enforcement attempts to placate U.S. concerns about perceived unwillingness to act on part of Mexican law enforcement).
254. Id.
255. See id. (raising concerns that elimination of customs barriers would facilitate
flow of drugs across U.S. borders).
256. See id. (suggesting that U.S. government should have secured change in Mexican government's policy of nonextradition in return for promise not to engage in overseas abductions).
257. See supra notes 213-23 and accompanying text (discussing evidence of significant corruption in Mexican regime, including police and military ranks).
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the most serious and most pervasive obstacle to progress in the
fight against drug trafficking in Mexico.25 8 In 1996, for example,
the Mexican Attorney General dismissed more than 1,200 Mexican federal law enforcement officers on charges of corruption.259
Despite these problems, the Mexican government is making
some strides in legal reform. 261 Under the Zedillo Administration, Mexico has made substantial progress in re-orienting its domestic priorities, policies, and institutions to enhance cooperation with the United States against drug trafficking.2 6 1 Additionally, the Mexican government's pronounced willingness to
extradite its nationals under the exceptional circumstances doctrine indicates potential for a more effective extradition policy.
The fact remains, however, that the Mexican government has yet
to extradite a Mexican defendant for drug-related charges. 6 2
CONCLUSION
Predictions about the ramifications of Alvarez were wrong.
To date, the United States is still party to over 100 extradition
treaties. The decision did not compromise U.S.-Mexican relations as many warned it would. Neither has it invited Mexico nor
any other state to invade U.S. jurisdiction and to violate the
rights of U.S. citizens. To the contrary, Alvarez led to renewed
efforts to strengthen strained relations between the states
through the signing of the Transborder Abduction Treaty, the
ratification of NAFTA, the Clinton Administration's decision to
re-certify Mexico for state aid in the fight against narcotics trafficking, and the Mexican government's pronounced willingness
to extradite its nationals under an exceptional circumstances
clause. While problems with drug trafficking and corruption
continue to plague U.S.-Mexican relations, these events are steps
in the right direction.
258. See id. (describing arrest of General Jesus Gutierrez Rebollo, head of Mexico's
drug law enforcement agency, in February 1997, for accepting bribes from Mexican
drug cartels arrests).
259. See id. (noting that some of these people were rehired and that none were
successfully prosecuted for corruption).
260. See supra note 215 and accompanying text (discussing recent implementation
of organized crime and money laundering laws in Mexico).
261. See id. (discussing changes in money laundering laws).
262. See supra note 231 and accompanying text (noting that there are fifty-two outstanding extradition requests for Mexican nationals wanted on drug charges).

